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Abstract
We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design, including
the black-box reductions of Cai et al. [CDW13b], simple auctions for additive buyers [HN12], and
posted-price mechanisms for unit-demand buyers [CHK07]. Additionally, we show that viewing these
three previously disjoint lines of work through the same lens leads to new developments as well. First, we
provide a duality framework for Bayesian mechanism design, which naturally accommodates multiple
agents and arbitrary objectives/feasibility constraints. Using this, we prove that either a posted-price
mechanism or the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction with per-bidder entry fees achieves a constant-factor
of the optimal revenue achievable by a Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanism whenever buyers are
unit-demand or additive, unifying previous breakthroughs of Chawla et al. [CHMS10] and Yao [Yao15],
and improving both approximation ratios (from 30 to 24 and 69 to 8, respectively). Finally, we show that
this view also leads to improved structural characterizations in the Cai et al. framework.
∗Supported by NSERC Discovery RGPIN-2015-06127. Work done in part while the author was a Research Fellow at the Simons
Institute for the Theory of Computing.
†Work done in part while the author was visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing.
‡Work done in part while the author was a Research Fellow at the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing.
1An earlier version of this work appeared under the same title in the proceedings of STOC 2016.
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1 Introduction
In the past several years, we have seen a tremendous advance in the field of Bayesian Mechanism Design,
based on ideas and concepts rooted in Theoretical Computer Science (TCS). For instance, due to a line of
work initiated by Chawla, Hartline, and Kleinberg [CHK07], we now know that posted-price mechanisms
are approximately optimal with respect to the optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible2 (BIC) mechanism
whenever buyers are unit-demand,3 and values are independent4 [CHMS10, CMS15, KW12]. Due to a line
of work initiated by Hart and Nisan [HN12], we now know that either running Myerson’s auction separately
for each item or running the VCG mechanism with a per-bidder entry fee5 is approximately optimal with
respect to the optimal BIC mechanism whenever buyers are additive, and values are independent [LY13,
BILW14, Yao15]. Due to a line of work initiated by Cai et al. [CDW12a], we now know that optimal
mechanisms are distributions over virtual welfare maximizers, and have computationally efficient algorithms
to find them in quite general settings [CDW12b, CDW13a, CDW13b, BGM13, DW15, DDW15]. The main
contribution of this work is a unified approach to these three previously disjoint research directions. At a
high level, we show how a new interpretation of the Cai-Daskalakis-Weinberg (CDW) framework provides
us a duality theory, which then allows us to strengthen the characterization results of Cai et al., as well
as interpret the benchmarks used in [CHK07, CHMS10, CMS15, KW12, HN12, CH13, LY13, BILW14] as
dual solutions. Surprisingly, we learn that essentially the same dual solution yields all the key benchmarks in
these works. We show how to extend this dual solution to multi-bidder settings, and analyze the mechanisms
developed in [CHMS10, Yao15] with respect to the resulting benchmarks. In both cases, our analysis yields
improved approximation ratios.
1.1 Simple vs. Optimal Auction Design
It is well-known by now that optimal multi-item auctions suffer many properties that are undesirable in
practice. For example, with just a single additive buyer and two items, the optimal auction could be random-
ized [Tha04, Pav11]. Moreover, there exist instances where the buyer’s two values are drawn from a cor-
related distribution where the optimal revenue achieves infinite revenue while the best deterministic mech-
anism achieves revenue ≤ 1 [BCKW10, HN13]. Even when the two item values are drawn independently,
the optimal mechanism might offer uncountably many different randomized options for the buyer to choose
from [DDT13]. Additionally, revenue-optimal multi-item auctions behave non-monotonically: there exist
distributions F and F+, where F+ stochastically dominates F , such that the revenue-optimal auction when
a single additive buyer’s values for two items are drawn from F ×F achieves strictly larger revenue than the
revenue-optimal auction when a single additive buyer’s values are drawn from F+ × F+ [HR12]. Finally,
it is known that revenue-optimal auctions may not be DSIC [Yao17], and are also #P-hard to find [DDT14].
In light of the aforementioned properties, simple mechanisms are often used in lieu of optimal mecha-
nisms in practice, and an active line of research coined “simple versus optimal” mechanism design [HR09]
aims to rigorously understand when simple mechanisms are appropriate in practice. Still, prior work es-
sentially shows that simple mechanisms are never exactly optimal, so the main goal of these works is to
2A mechanism is Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) if it is in every bidder’s interest to tell the truth, assuming that all other
bidders’ reported their true values. A mechanism is Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) if it is in every bidder’s
interest to tell the truth no matter what reports the other bidders make.
3A valuation is unit-demand if v(S) = maxi∈S{v({i})}. A valuation is additive if v(S) =∑i∈S v({i}).
4That is, the random variables {vij}i,j are independent (where vij denotes bidder i’s value for item j).
5By this, we mean that the mechanism offers each bidder the option to participate for bi, which might depend on the other
bidders’ bids but not bidder i’s. If they choose to participate, then they play in the VCG auction (and pay any additional prices that
VCG charges them).
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understand when simple mechanisms are approximately optimal.6 Some of the most exciting contributions
from TCS to Bayesian mechanism design have come from this direction, and include a line of work initiated
by Chawla et al. [CHK07] for unit-demand buyers, and Hart and Nisan [HN12] for additive buyers.
In a setting with m heterogeneous items for sale and n unit-demand buyers whose values for the items
are drawn independently, the state-of-the-art shows that a simple posted-price mechanism7 obtains a constant
factor of the optimal BIC revenue (the revenue of the optimal BIC mechanism) [CHK07, CHMS10, CMS15,
KW12]. The main idea behind these works is a multi- to single-dimensional reduction. They consider a
related setting where each bidder is split into m separate copies, one for each item, with bidder i’s copy j
interested only in item j. The value distributions are the same as the original multi-dimensional setting. One
key ingredient driving these works is that the optimal revenue in the original setting is upper bounded by a
small constant times the optimal revenue in the copies setting.
In a setting with m heterogeneous items for sale and n additive buyers whose values for the items are
drawn independently, the state-of-the-art result shows that for all inputs, either running Myerson’s optimal
single-item auction for each item separately or running the VCG auction with a per-bidder entry fee obtains
a constant factor of the optimal BIC revenue [HN12, LY13, BILW14, Yao15]. One main idea behind these
works is a “core-tail decomposition”, that breaks the revenue down into cases where the buyers have either
low (the core) or high (the tail) values.
Although these two approaches appear different at first, we are able to show that they in fact arise from
basically the same dual in our duality theory. Essentially, we show that a specific dual solution within our
framework gives rise to an upper bound that decomposes into the sum of two terms, one that looks like the
the copies benchmark, and one that looks like the core-tail benchmark. In terms of concrete results, this new
understanding yields improved approximation ratios on both fronts. For additive buyers, we improve the
ratio provided by Yao [Yao15] from 69 to 8. For unit-demand buyers, we improve the approximation ratio
provided by Chawla et al. [CHMS10] from 30 to 24.
In addition to these concrete results, our work makes the following conceptual contributions as well.
First, while the single-buyer core-tail decomposition techniques (first introduced by Li and Yao [LY13]) are
now becoming standard [LY13, BILW14, RW15, BDHS15], they do not generalize naturally to multiple
buyers. Yao [Yao15] introduced new techniques in his extension to multi-buyers termed “β-adjusted rev-
enue” and “β-exclusive mechanisms,” which are technically quite involved. Our duality-based proof can be
viewed as a natural generalization of the core-tail decomposition to multi-buyer settings. Second, we use
basically the same analysis for both additive and unit-demand valuations, meaning that our framework pro-
vides a unified approach to tackle both settings. Finally, we wish to point out that the key difference between
our proofs and those of [CHMS10, BILW14, Yao15] are our duality-based benchmarks: we are able to im-
mediately get more mileage out of these benchmarks while barely needing to develop new approximation
techniques. Indeed, the bulk of the work is in properly decomposing our benchmarks into terms that can be
approximated using ideas similar to prior work. All these suggest that our techniques are likely be useful in
more general settings (and indeed, they have been: see Section 1.3).
6On this front, one should not interpret (say) an 8-approximation as suggesting that sellers should be happy with 1/8 of the
revenue they could potentially achieve. Rather, these guarantees are meant to be interpreted more qualitatively, and suggest claims
like “If simple auctionA guarantees a small constant-factor approximation in the worst-case, but simple auctionB does not, maybe
it’s safer to use auction A in practice.”
7 A posted price mechanism visits each buyer one at a time and posts a price for each item. The buyer can then select any subset
of items and pay the corresponding prices. Observe that such a mechanism is DSIC.
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1.2 Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
Another recent contribution of the TCS community is the CDW framework for generic Bayesian mechanism
design problems. Here, it is shown that Bayesian mechanism design problems for essentially any objective
can be solved with black-box access just to an algorithm that optimizes a perturbed version of that same
objective. That is, even though the original mechanism design problem involves incentives, the optimal BIC
mechanism can be found via black-box queries to an algorithm (where the input is known/given and there
are no incentives), but this algorithm optimizes a perturbed objective instead. One aspect of this line of
work is computational: we now have computationally efficient algorithms to find the optimal (or approxi-
mately optimal) mechanism in numerous settings of interest (including the aforementioned cases of many
additive/unit-demand buyers, but significantly more general as well). Another aspect is structural: we now
know, for instance, that in all settings that fit into this framework, the revenue-optimal mechanism is a distri-
bution over virtual welfare optimizers.8 A mechanism is a virtual welfare optimizer if it pointwise optimizes
the virtual welfare (that is, on every input, it selects an outcome that maximizes the virtual welfare). The
virtual welfare is given by a virtual valuation/transformation, which is a mapping from valuations to linear
combinations of valuations.
The structural characterization from previous work roughly ends here: the guaranteed virtual transfor-
mations were randomized with no promise any additional properties beyond their existence (and that they
could be found in poly-time). Our contribution to this line of work is to improve the existing structural
characterization. Specifically, we show that every instance has a strong dual in the form of n disjoint flows,
one for each agent. The nodes in agent i’s flow correspond to possible types of this agent,9 and non-zero
flow from type ti(·) to t′i(·) captures that the incentive constraint between ti(·) and t′i(·) binds. We show
how a flow induces a virtual transformation, and that the optimal dual gives a virtual valuation function such
that:
1. This virtual valuation function is deterministic and can be found computationally efficiently.
2. The optimal mechanism has expected revenue = its expected virtual welfare, and every BIC mecha-
nism has expected revenue ≤ its expected virtual welfare.
3. The optimal mechanism optimizes virtual welfare pointwise (i.e. on every input, the virtual welfare
maximizing outcome is selected).10
Here are a few examples of the benefits of such a characterization (which cannot be deduced from [CDW13b]).
First, the promised virtual valuation function certifies the optimality of the optimal mechanism: every BIC
mechanism has expected revenue ≤ its expected virtual welfare, yet the optimal mechanism maximizes vir-
tual welfare pointwise. Second, by looking at the promised virtual valuation function, we can immediately
determine which incentive constraints “matter.” Specifically, if the flow corresponding to the promised vir-
tual valuation function sends flow from ti(·) to t′i(·), then removing the constraint guaranteeing that ti(·)
prefers to tell the truth rather than report t′i(·) (e.g. through some form of verification) would increase the
optimal achievable revenue.11 Such a characterization should prove a valuable analytical tool for multi-item
auctions, akin to Myerson’s virtual values for single-dimensional settings [Mye81].
8Their reduction applies to objectives beyond revenue, such as makespan. The focus of the present paper is on revenue, so we
only focus on the projection of their results onto this setting.
9Both the CDW framework and our duality theory only apply directly if there are finitely many possible types for each agent.
10This could be randomized; there is always a deterministic maximizer but in cases where the optimal mechanism is randomized,
the virtual transformations are such that there are numerous maximizers, and the optimal mechanism selects one of them from a
particular probability distribution.
11This claim is only guaranteed to be true in non-degenerate instances with a unique optimal dual - and exactly results from the
fact that relaxing tight constraints in non-degenerate LPs improves the optimal solution.
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1.3 Related Work
1.3.1 Duality Frameworks
Recently, strong duality frameworks for a single additive buyer were developed in [DDT13, DDT15, DDT16,
GK14, Gia14, GK15]. These frameworks show that the dual problem to revenue optimization for a sin-
gle additive buyer can be interpreted as an optimal transport/bipartite matching problem. Work of Hart-
line and Haghpanah also provides an alternative “path-finding” duality framework for a single additive or
unit-demand buyer, and has a more similar flavor to ours (as flows can be interpreted as distributions over
paths) [HH15]. When they exist, these paths provide a witness that a certain Myerson-type mechanism
is optimal, but the paths are not guaranteed to exist in all instances. Also similar is independent work of
Carroll, which also makes use of a partial Lagrangian over incentive constraints, again for a single addi-
tive buyer [Car16]. In addition to their mathematical beauty, these duality frameworks also serve as tools
to prove that mechanisms are optimal. These tools have been successfully applied to provide conditions
when pricing only the grand bundle (give the buyer the choice only to buy everything or nothing) [DDT13],
posting a uniform item pricing (post the same price on every item) [HH15], or even employing a random-
ized mechanism [GK15] is optimal when selling to a single additive or unit-demand buyer. However, none
of these frameworks currently applies in multi-bidder settings, and to date have been unable to yield any
approximate optimality results in the (single bidder) settings where they do apply.
We also wish to argue that our duality is perhaps more transparent than existing theories. For instance,
it is easy to interpret dual solutions in our framework as virtual valuation functions, and dual solutions for
multiple buyer instances just list a dual for each single buyer. In addition, we are able to re-derive and
improve the breakthrough results of [CHK07, CHMS10, CMS15, HN12, LY13, BILW14, Yao15] using
essentially the same dual solution. Still, it is not our goal to subsume previous duality theories, and our
new theory certainly doesn’t. For instance, previous frameworks are capable of proving that a mechanism is
exactly optimal when the input distributions are continuous. Our theory as-is can only handle distributions
with finite support exactly.12 However, we have demonstrated that there is at least one important domain
(simple and approximately optimal mechanisms) where our theory seems to be more applicable.
1.3.2 Related Techniques
Techniques similar to ours have appeared in prior works as well. For instance, the idea to use Lagrangian
multipliers/LP duality for mechanism design dates back at least to early work of Laffont and Robert for
selling a single item to budget-constrained bidders [LR98], is discussed extensively for instance in [Mye97,
Voh11], and also used for example in recent works as well [BGM13, Voh12]. It is also apparently informal
knowledge among some economists that Myerson’s seminal result [Mye81] can be proved using some form
of LP duality, and some versions of these proofs have been published as well (e.g. [MV04]). Still, we include
in Section 4 a proof of [Mye81] in our framework to serve as a warm-up (and because some elements of the
proof are simplified via our approach).
The idea to use “paths” of incentive compatibility constraints to upper bound revenue in single-bidder
problems dates back at least to work of Rochet and Chone´ studying revenue optimization in general multi-
item settings [RC98], and Armstrong [Arm96, Arm99], which studies the special case of a single bidder and
two items. More recently, Cai et al. use this approach to prove hardness of approximation for a single bidder
with submodular valuations for multiple items [CDW13b], Hartline and Haghpanah provide sufficient con-
ditions for especially simple mechanisms to be optimal for a single unit-demand or additive bidder [HH15],
and Carroll proves that selling separately is max-min optimal for a single additive buyer when only the
12Our theory can still handle continuous distributions arbitrarily well. See Section 2.
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marginals are known but not the (possibly correlated) joint value distribution [Car16]. Indeed, many of
these works also observe that the term “virtual welfare” is appropriate to describe the resulting upper bounds.
Still, these works focus exclusively on providing conditions for certain mechanisms to be exactly optimal,
and therefore impose some technical conditions on the settings where they apply. In comparison, our work
pushes the boundaries by accommodating both approximation (in the sense that our framework can prove
that simple mechanisms are approximately optimal and not just that optimal mechanisms are optimal) and
unrestricted settings (in the sense that our framework isn’t restricted to a single buyer, or additive/unit-
demand valuations).
Finally, we note that some of the benchmarks used in later sections can be derived without appealing
to duality [CMS15]. Therefore, a duality theory is not “necessary” in order to obtain our benchmarks.
Still, prior to our work it was unknown that these benchmarks were at all useful outside of the unit-demand
settings for which they were developed. Additionally, both the primal and dual understanding of these
benchmarks is valuable for extending the state-of-the-art, discussed in more detail below. Prior work has
also obtained approximately optimal auctions via some sort of “benchmark decomposition” in the unrelated
setting of digital goods [CGL15].
1.3.3 Approximation in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
Finally, we provide a brief overview of recent work providing simple and approximately optimal mecha-
nisms in multi-item settings. Seminal work of Chawla, Hartline, and Kleinberg proves that a posted-price
mechanism gets a 3-approximation to the optimal deterministic mechanism for a single unit-demand buyer
with independently drawn item values [CHK07]. Chawla et al. improve the ratio to 2, and prove a bound of
6.75 against the optimal deterministic, DSIC mechanism for multiple buyers [CHMS10]. Chawla, Malec,
and Sivan show that the bound degrades by at most a factor of 5 when comparing to the optimal randomized,
BIC mechanism [CMS15]. Kleinberg and Weinberg improve the bound of 6.75 to 6 [KW12]. Roughgar-
den, Talgam-Cohen and Yan provide a prior-independent “supply-limiting” mechanism in this setting, and
also prove a Bulow-Klemperer [BK96] result: the VCG mechanism with additional bidders yields more
expected revenue than the optimal deterministic, DSIC mechanism (with the original number of bidders),
when bidder valuations are unit-demand, i.i.d., and values for items are regular and independent (possi-
bly asymmetric) [RTCY12]. All of these results get mileage from the “OPTCOPIES” benchmark initiated
in [CHK07].
More recent influential work of Hart and Nisan proves that selling each item separately at its My-
erson reserve13 gets an O(log2m) approximation to the optimal mechanism for a single additive buyer
and m independent (possibly asymmetric) items [HN12]. Li and Yao improve this to O(logm), which is
tight [LY13]. Babaioff et al. prove that the better of selling separately and bundling together gets a 6-
approximation [BILW14]. Bateni et al. extend this to a model of limited correlation [BDHS15]. Rubinstein
and Weinberg extend this to a single buyer with “subadditive valuations over independent items” [RW15].
Yao shows that the better of selling each item separately using Myerson’s auction and running VCG with
a per-bidder entry fee gets a 69-approximation when there are many additive buyers and all values for all
items are independent [Yao15]. Goldner and Karlin show how to use these results to obtain approximately
optimal prior-independent mechanisms for many additive buyers [GK16]. More recently, Chawla and Miller
show that a posted-price mechanism with per-bidder entry fee gets a constant-factor approximation for many
bidders with “additive valuations subject to matroid constraints” [CM16]. All of these results get mileage
from the “core-tail decomposition” initiated in [LY13].
13The Myerson reserve of a one-dimensional distribution refers to the revenue-optimal price to set if one seller is selling only
this item to a single buyer.
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The present paper unifies these two lines of work by showing that the OPTCOPIES benchmark and the
core-tail decomposition both arise from essentially the same dual in our duality theory. These benchmarks
provide a necessary starting point for the above results, but proving guarantees against these benchmarks of
course still requires significant work. We believe that our duality theory now provides the necessary starting
point to extend these results to much more general settings, as evidenced by the follow-up works discussed
below.
1.3.4 Subsequent Work
Since the presentation of an earlier version of this work at STOC 2016, numerous follow-up works have
successfully made use of our framework to design (approximately) optimal auctions in much more general
settings. For example, Cai and Zhao show that the better of a posted-price mechanism and an anonymous
posted-price mechanism with per-bidder entry fee gets a constant-factor approximation for many bidders
with “XOS valuations over independent items” [CZ17]. This extends the previous state-of-the-art [CM16]
from Gross Substitutes to XOS valuations. Eden et al. show that the better of selling separately and bundling
together gets an O(d)-approximation for a single bidder with “complementarity-d valuations over indepen-
dent items” [EFF+17b]. The same authors also prove a Bulow-Klemperer result: the VCG mechanism with
additional bidders yields more expected revenue than the optimal randomized, BIC mechanism (with the
original number of bidders), when bidder valuations are “additive subject to downward closed constraints,”
i.i.d., and values for items are regular and independent (possibly asymmetric) [EFF+17a]. Brustle et al.
design a simple mechanism that achieves 12 of the optimal gains from trade in certain two-sided markets,
such as bilateral trading and double auctions [BCWZ17]. Devanur and Weinberg provide an alternative
proof of Fiat et al.’s solution to the “FedEx Problem,” and extend it to design the optimal auction for a single
buyer with a private budget [FGKK16, DW17]. Finally, Liu and Psomas provide a Bulow-Klemperer result
for dynamic auctions [LP16], and Fu et al. design approximately optimal BIC mechanisms for correlated
bidders [FLLT17].
Organization. We provide preliminaries and notation below. In Section 3, we present our duality theory
for revenue maximization in the special case of additive/unit-demand bidders. In Section 4, we present a
duality proof of Myerson’s seminal result, and in Section 5 we present a canonical dual solution that proves
useful in different settings. As a warm-up, we show in Section 6 how to analyze this dual solution when
there is just a single buyer. In Section 7, we provide the multi-bidder analysis, which is more technical. In
Section 8, we conclude with a formal statement of our duality theory in general settings.
2 Preliminaries
Optimal Auction Design. For the bulk of the paper, we will study the following setting (in Section 8, we
will show that our duality theory holds much more generally). The buyers (we will use the terms buyer
and bidder interchangeably) are either all unit-demand or all additive, with buyer i having value tij for
item j. Recall that a valuation is unit-demand if v(S) = maxi∈S{v({i})} and a valuation is additive if
v(S) =
∑
i∈S v({i}). We use ti = (ti1, . . . , tim) to denote buyer i’s values for all the goods and t−i to
denote every buyer except i’s values for all the goods. Tij is the set of all possible values of buyer i for item
j, Ti = ×jTij , T−i = ×i∗ 6=iTi∗ and T = ×iTi. All values for all items are drawn independently. We denote
by Dij the distribution of tij , Di = ×jDij , Di,−j = ×j∗ 6=jDij∗ , D = ×iDi, and D−i = ×i∗ 6=iDi∗ , and fij
(or fi, fi,−j , f−i, etc.) the densities of these finite-support distributions (that is, fi(x) = Prti∼Di [ti = x]).
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We define F to be a set system over [n]× [m] that describes all feasible allocations.14
A mechanism takes as input a reported type from each bidder and selects (possibly randomly) an outcome
in F , and payments to charge the bidders. A mechanism is Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) if it is in
each buyers interest to report their true type, assuming that the other buyers do so as well, and Bayesian
Individually Rational (BIR) if each buyer gets non-negative utility for reporting their true type (assuming
that the other bidders do so as well). The revenue of an auction is simply the expected sum of payments made
when bidders drawn from D report their true values. The optimal auction optimizes expected revenue over
all BIC and BIR mechanisms. For a given value distributionD, we denote by REV(D) the expected revenue
achieved by this auction, and it will be clear from context whether buyers are additive or unit-demand. For
a specific BIC mechanism M , we will also use REVM (D) to denote the expected revenue achieved by M
when bidders with valuations drawn from D report truthfully.
Reduced Forms. The reduced form of an auction stores for all bidders i, items j, and types ti, the probability
that bidder i will receive item j when reporting ti to the mechanism (over the randomness in the mechanism
and randomness in other bidders’ reported types, assuming they come from D−i) as piij(ti). It is easy to see
that if a buyer is additive, or unit-demand and receives only one item at a time, that their expected value for
reporting type t′i to the mechanism is just ti · pii(t′i) (where we treat ti and pii(t′i) as vectors, and · denotes
a vector dot-product). We say that a reduced form is feasible if there exists some feasible mechanism
(that ex-post selects an outcome in F with probability 1) that matches the probabilities promised by the
reduced form. If P (F , D) is defined to be the set of all feasible reduced forms, it is easy to see (and shown
in [CDW12a], for instance) that P (F , D) is closed and convex.
We will also use pi(ti) to refer to the expected payment made by bidder i when reporting ti to the mech-
anism (over the randomness in the mechanism and randomness in other bidders’ reported types, assuming
they come from D−i).
Simple Mechanisms. Even though the benchmark we target is the optimal randomized BIC mechanism,
the simple mechanisms we design will all be deterministic and satisfy DSIC. For a single buyer, the two
mechanisms we consider are selling separately and selling together. Selling separately posts a price pj on
each item j and lets the buyer purchase whatever subset of items she pleases. We denote by SREV(D) the
revenue of the optimal such pricing. Selling together posts a single price p on the grand bundle, and lets
the buyer purchase the entire bundle for p or nothing. We denote by BREV(D) the revenue of the optimal
such pricing. For multiple buyers the generalization of selling together is the VCG mechanism with an entry
fee, which offers to each bidder i the opportunity to pay an entry fee ei(t−i) and participate in the VCG
mechanism (paying any additional fees charged by the VCG mechanism). If they choose not to pay the
entry fee, they pay nothing and receive nothing. We denote the revenue of the mechanism that charges the
optimal entry fees to the buyers as BVCG(D), and VCG(D) the revenue of the VCG mechanism with no
entry fees. The generalization of selling separately is a little different, and described immediately below.
Single-Dimensional Copies. A benchmark that shows up in our decompositions relates the multi-dimensional
instances we care about to a single-dimensional setting, and originated in work of Chawla et. al. [CHK07].
For any multi-dimensional instance D we can imagine splitting bidder i into m different copies, with bid-
der i’s copy j interested only in receiving item j and nothing else. So in this new instance there are nm
single-dimensional bidders, and copy (i, j)’s value for winning is tij (which is still drawn from Dij). The
set system F from the original setting now specifies which copies can simultaneously win. We denote by
OPTCOPIES(D) the revenue of Myerson’s optimal auction [Mye81] in the copies setting induced by D.15
14When bidders are additive, F only allows allocating each item at most once. When bidders are unit-demand, F contains all
matchings between the bidders and the items.
15Note that when buyers are additive that OPTCOPIES is exactly the revenue of selling items separately using Myerson’s optimal
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Continuous versus Finite-Support Distributions. Our approach explicitly assumes that the input dis-
tributions have finite support. This is a standard assumption when computation is involved. However,
most existing works in the simple vs. optimal paradigm hold even for continuous distributions (includ-
ing [CHK07, CHMS10, CMS15, HN12, LY13, BILW14, Yao15, RW15, BDHS15]). Fortunately, it is known
that everyD can be discretized intoD+ such that REV(D) ∈ [(1−)REV(D+), (1+)REV(D+)], andD+
has finite support. So all of our results can be made arbitrarily close to exact for continuous distributions.
We conclude this section by proving this formally, making use of the following theorem proved in [RW15],
which draws from prior works [HL10, HKM11, BH11, DW12]. Note that the theorem below holds for
distributions over arbitrary valuation functions ti(·), and not just additve/unit-demand.
Theorem 1. [RW15, DW12] Let M be any BIC mechanism for values drawn from distribution D, and for
all i, let Di and D+i be any two distributions, with coupled samples ti(·) and t+i (·) such that t+i (x) ≥ ti(x)
for all x ∈ F . If δi(·) = t+i (·) − ti(·), then for any  > 0, there exists a BIC mechanism M ′ such that
REVM
′
(D+) ≥ (1 − )(REVM (D) − VAL(δ) ), where VAL(δ) denotes the expected welfare of the VCG
allocation when buyer i’s type is drawn according to the random variable δi(·).
To see how this implies that our duality is arbitrarily close to exact for continuous distributions, let Di
be the distribution that first samples ti(·) from Di, then outputs ti(·) such that ti(x) = ti(x) · 1(ti([m]) ≤
1/).16 It is easy to see that as → 0, REVM (D)→ REVM (D): for every mechanismM and every η > 0,
there exists an  > 0 such that a (1 − η) fraction of M ’s revenue when buyers’ types are drawn from D
comes from buyers with ti([m]) ≤ 1/17. For the chosen , M is still a BIC mechanism when buyers’ types
are drawn from D, and its revenue under D is at least (1− η) fraction of its revenue under D. So we can
get arbitrarily close while only considering distributions that are bounded.
Now for any bounded distribution Di, define D
+,
i to first sample ti(·) from Di, then output t+,i (·)
such that t+,i (x) = 
2 · dti(x)/2e. Similarly define D−,i to first sample ti(·) from Di, then output t−,i (·)
such that t−,i (x) = 
2 · (dti(x)/2e − 1). Then it’s clear that D+,i , Di, and D−,i can be coupled so that
t+,i (x) ≥ ti(x) ≥ t−,i (x) for all x, and that taking either of the two consecutive differences results in a δi(·)
such that δi(x) ≤ 2 for all x. So for any desired , applying Theorem 1 with M as the optimal mechanism
for D, we get a mechanism M ′ for D+, with revenue at least (1 − )REV(D) − n. Similarly, applying
Theorem 1 with M as the optimal mechanism for D−,, we get a mechanism M ′ for D with revenue at least
(1−)REV(D−,)−n. Together, these claims imply that REV(D) ∈ [(1−)REV(D−,)−n, REV(D+,)1− +
n
1− ]. Finally, we just observe that REV(D
+,) = REV(D−,) + n (the revenue of the optimal mechanism
increases by exactly n going from D−, to D+,), as every buyer values every outcome at exactly  more in
D+, versus D−,. So as → 0, both approach REV(D). Note that both D+, and D−, have finite support,
so our theory will directly design M that achieve constant-factor approximations for REV(D−,).
3 Our Duality Theory
In this section we provide our duality framework, specialized to unit-demand/additive bidders. We begin by
writing the linear program (LP) for revenue maximization (Figure 1). For ease of notation, assume that there
is a special type ∅ to represent the option of not participating in the auction. That means pii(∅) = 0 and
pi(∅) = 0. Now a Bayesian IR (BIR) constraint is simply another BIC constraint: for any type ti, bidder i
auction in the original setting.
16That is, if the value of ti for the grand bundle satisfies ti([m]) ≤ 1/, then ti(x) = ti(x). Otherwise, ti(x) = 0 for all x.
17Similarly, if M achieves infinite revenue, then for every η > 0, there exists an  > 0 such that the revenue of M when buyers’
types are drawn from D coming from buyers with ti([m]) ≤ 1/ is at least 1/η. So our approach will still show that whenever
REV(D) is infinite, the revenue of the approximately optimal mechanisms we use is unbounded.
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will not want to lie to type ∅. We let T+i = Ti ∪ {∅}. To proceed, we will introduce a variable λi(t, t′) for
each of the BIC constraints, and take the partial Lagrangian of LP 1 by Lagrangifying all BIC constraints.
The theory of Lagrangian multipliers tells us that the solution to LP 1 is equivalent to the primal variables
solving the partially Lagrangified dual (Figure 2).
Variables:
• pi(ti), for all bidders i and types ti ∈ Ti, denoting the expected price paid by bidder i when
reporting type ti over the randomness of the mechanism and the other bidders’ types.
• piij(ti), for all bidders i, items j, and types ti ∈ Ti, denoting the probability that bidder i receives
item j when reporting type ti over the randomness of the mechanism and the other bidders’ types.
Constraints:
• pii(ti) · ti − pi(ti) ≥ pii(t′i) · ti − pi(t′i), for all bidders i, and types ti ∈ Ti, t′i ∈ T+i , guaranteeing
that the reduced form mechanism (pi, p) is BIC and BIR.
• pi ∈ P (F , D), guaranteeing pi is feasible.
Objective:
• Maximize:∑ni=1∑ti∈Ti fi(ti) · pi(ti), the expected revenue.
Figure 1: A Linear Program (LP) for Revenue Optimization.
Variables:
• λi(ti, t′i) for all i, ti ∈ Ti, t′i ∈ T+i , the Lagrangian multipliers for Bayesian IC constraints.
Constraints:
• λi(ti, t′i) ≥ 0 for all i, ti ∈ Ti, t′i ∈ T+i , guaranteeing that the Lagrangian multipliers are non-
negative.
Objective:
• Minimize: maxpi∈P (F ,D),p L(λ, pi, p).
Figure 2: Partial Lagrangian of the Revenue Maximization LP.
Definition 2. Let L(λ, pi, p) be the partial Lagrangian defined as follows:
L(λ, pi, p) =
n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti) · pi(ti) +
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
t′i∈T+i
λi(ti, t
′
i) ·
(
ti ·
(
pi(ti)− pi(t′i)
)− (pi(ti)− pi(t′i)))

(1)
=
n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
pi(ti)
(
fi(ti)+
∑
t′i∈Ti
λi(t
′
i, ti)−
∑
t′i∈T+i
λi(ti, t
′
i)
)
+
n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
pii(ti)
( ∑
t′i∈T+i
ti · λi(ti, t′i)−
∑
t′i∈Ti
t′i · λi(t′i, ti)
)
(2)
9
3.1 Useful Properties of the Dual Problem
In this section, we make some observations about the dual problem to get some traction on what duals might
induce useful upper bounds.
Definition 3 (Useful Dual). A feasible dual solution λ is useful if maxpi∈P (F ,D),p L(λ, pi, p) <∞.
Lemma 4 (Useful Dual). A dual solution λ is useful if and only if for each bidder i, λi forms a valid flow,
i.e., iff the following satisfies flow conservation (flow in = flow out) at all nodes except the source and the
sink:
• Nodes: A super source s and a super sink ∅, along with a node ti for every type ti ∈ Ti.
• Flow from s to ti of weight fi(ti), for all ti ∈ Ti.
• Flow from t to t′ of weight λi(t, t′) for all t ∈ T , and t′ ∈ T+i (including the sink ∅).
Proof. Let us think of L(λ, pi, p) using expression (2). Clearly, if there exists any i and ti ∈ Ti such that
fi(ti) +
∑
t′i∈Ti
λi(t
′
i, ti)−
∑
t′i∈T+i
λi(ti, t
′
i) 6= 0,
then since pi(ti) is unconstrained (note that we do not include the constraints pi(ti) ≥ 0 in Figure 1, so these
variables are indeed unconstrained) and has a non-zero multiplier in the objective, maxpi∈P (F ,D),p L(λ, pi, p) =
+∞. Therefore, in order for λ to be useful, we must have
fi(ti) +
∑
t′i∈Ti
λi(t
′
i, ti)−
∑
t′i∈T+i
λi(ti, t
′
i) = 0
for all i and ti ∈ Ti. This is exactly saying what we described in the Lemma statement is a flow. The
other direction is simple, whenever λ forms a flow, L(λ, pi, p) only depends on pi. Since pi is bounded, the
maximization problem has a finite value.
Definition 5 (Virtual Value Function). For each λ, we define a corresponding virtual value function Φλ(·),
such that for every bidder i, every type ti ∈ Ti, Φλi (ti) = ti − 1fi(ti)
∑
t′i∈Ti λi(t
′
i, ti)(t
′
i − ti). Note that for
all i, Φλi (·) is a vector-valued function, so we use Φλij(·) to refer to the jth component of Φλi (·), and refer to
this as bidder i’s virtual value for item j.
Theorem 6 (Virtual Welfare ≥ Revenue). Let λ be any useful dual solution and M = (pi, p) be any BIC
mechanism. The revenue ofM is less than or equal to the virtual welfare of pi w.r.t. the virtual value function
Φλ(·) corresponding to λ. That is:
n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti) · pi(ti) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti) · pii(ti) · Φλi (ti).
Equality holds if and only if for all i, t, t′ such that λi(t, t′) > 0, the BIC constraint for bidder i between t
and t′ binds in M (that is, bidder i with type t is indifferent between reporting t and t′). Furthermore, let λ∗
be the optimal dual variables and M∗ = (pi∗, p∗) be the revenue-optimal BIC mechanism, then the expected
virtual welfare with respect to Φ∗ (induced by λ∗) under pi∗ equals the expected revenue of M∗, and
pi∗ ∈ argmaxpi∈P (F ,D)

n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti) · pii(ti) · Φ∗i (ti)
 .
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Proof. When λ is useful, we can simplify L(λ, pi, p) by removing all terms associated with p (because all
such terms have a multiplier of zero, by Lemma 4), and replace the terms
∑
t′i∈T+i λi(ti, t
′
i) with fi(ti) +∑
t′i∈Ti λi(t
′
i, ti). After the simplification, we have L(λ, pi, p) =
∑n
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti fi(ti) · pii(ti) ·
(
ti − 1fi(ti) ·∑
t′i∈Ti λi(t
′
i, ti)(t
′
i − ti)
)
, which equals
∑n
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti fi(ti) · pii(ti) · Φλi (ti), exactly the virtual welfare of
pi. Now, we only need to prove that L(λ, pi, p) is greater than the revenue of M . Let us think of L(λ, pi, p)
using Expression (1). Since M is a BIC mechanism, ti ·
(
pi(ti) − pi(t′i)
) − (pi(ti) − pi(t′i)) ≥ 0 for any i
and ti ∈ Ti, t′i ∈ T+i . Also, all the dual variables λ are nonnegative. Therefore, it is clear that L(λ, pi, p)
is at least as large as the revenue of M . Moreover, if the BIC constraint for bidder i between t and t′ binds
in M for all i, t, t′ such that λi(t, t′) > 0, then we in fact have L(λ, pi, p) =
∑
i
∑
ti
fi(ti)pi(ti), so the
revenue of M is equal to its expected virtual welfare under Φλ(·) (because the Lagrangian terms added to
the revenue are all zero).
When λ∗ is the optimal dual solution, by strong LP duality applied to the LP of Figure 1, we know
maxpi∈P (F ,D),p L(λ∗, pi, p) equals the revenue of M∗. But we also know that L(λ∗, pi∗, p∗) is at least as
large as the revenue of M∗, so pi∗ necessarily maximizes the virtual welfare over all pi ∈ P (F , D), with
respect to the virtual transformation Φ∗ corresponding to λ∗.
To summarize: we have shown that every flow induces a finite upper bound on how much revenue a BIC
mechanism can possibly achieve. We have also observed that this upper bound can be interpreted as the
maximum virtual welfare obtainable with respect to a virtual valuation function that is decided by the flow.
In the next two sections, we will instantiate this theory by designing specific flows, and obtain benchmarks
that upper bound the optimal revenue.
4 Canonical Flow for a Single Item
In this section, we provide a canonical flow for single-item settings, and show that it implies the main result
from Myerson’s seminal work [Mye81]. Essentially, Myerson proposes a specific virtual valuation function
and shows that for this virtual valuation function, the expected revenue of any BIC mechanism is always
upper bounded by its expected virtual welfare. Moreover, he describes an ironing procedure to guarantee
that this virtual valuation is monotone, and proves that the revenue-optimal mechanism simply awards the
item to the bidder with the highest virtual value. Myerson’s proof is quite elegant, and we are not claiming
that our proof below is simpler.18 The purpose of the proof below is:
• Serve as a warm-up for the reader to get comfortable with flows and virtual valuations.
• Separate out parts of the proof that can be directly applied to more general settings (e.g. Theorem 6).
• Provide a specific flow that will be used in later sections to provide benchmarks in multi-item settings.
In this section, we will have m = 1 and drop the item subscript j. We begin with a definition of
Myerson’s (ironed) virtual valuation function, adapted to the discrete setting.
Definition 7 (Single-dimensional Virtual Value). For a single-dimensional discrete discributionDi, if fi(ti) >
0, let ϕDii (ti) = ti −
(t′i−ti)·Prt∼Di [t>ti]
fi(ti)
, where t′i = mint>ti,t∈Ti{t}. If fi(ti) = 0, let ϕDii (ti) = 0.19 If the
distribution Di is clear from context, we will just write ϕi(ti).
18If one’s goal is simply to understand Myerson’s result and nothing more, the original proof and ours are comparable in sim-
plicity. Many alternative comparably simple proofs exist as well, some of which are not much different than ours (e.g. [MV04]).
19Actually we could define ϕDii (ti) arbitrarily and everything that follows will still hold.
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The ironing procedure described below essentially finds any non-monotonicities in ϕi(·) and “irons”
them out. Note that Steps 4 and 5 maintain that ironed virtual values are consistent within any ironed
interval.
Definition 8 (Ironing). Let∼ be an equivalence relation on the support ofDi, and ϕ˜(·) be the ironed virtual
valuation function defined in the following way. We say that an interval [t∗i , ti] is ironed if t ∼ t′ for all
t, t′ ∈ [t∗i , ti].
1. Initialize ti = maxt∈Ti{t}, the highest un-ironed type.
2. For any t ≤ ti, define the average virtual value a([t, ti]) =
∑
t′∈[t,ti] fi(t
′)·ϕi(t′)∑
t′∈[t,ti] fi(t
′) .
3. Let t∗i maximize the average virtual value. That is, t
∗
i = arg maxt≤ti a([t, ti]) (break ties in favor of
the maximum such t∗i ).
4. Update ϕ˜i(t) = a([t∗i , ti]) for all t ∈ [t∗i , ti].
5. Update t ∼ t′ for all t, t′ ∈ [t∗i , ti].
6. Update ti = maxt<t∗i ,t∈Ti{t}, the highest un-ironed type.
7. Return to Step 2.
These definitions in the discrete case might be slightly different than what readers are used to in the
continuous case. We provide some observations proving that this is “the right” definition for the discrete
case briefly in Section 4.1. Our proof continues in Section 4.2.
4.1 Discrete Myersonian Virtual Values
In the continuous setting, Myerson’s virtual valuation is defined as ϕi(v) = v − 1−Fi(v)fi(v) , where Fi and fi
are the CDF and PDF of Di. We first show that for any continuous distribution, discretizing it into multiples
of  and taking virtual valuations as in Definition 7, we recover Myerson’s virtual valuation in the limt as
→ 0.
Observation 9. LetDi be any continuous distribution, andDi be the discretization ofDi with point-masses
at all multiples of . That is, f i (c) =
∫ (c+1)
c fi(x)dx for all c ∈ N. Then for all ti,
lim sup
→0
ϕ
Di
i (ti) = ti −
1− Fi(ti)
fi(ti)
.
Proof. For fixed ti, consider the set of  ∈ {ti/c | c ∈ N}. Then clearly for all  outside this set, ϕD

i
i (ti) = 0.
For any  in this set, we have ϕD

i
i (ti) = ti −
·Prt∼Di [t>ti+]
Prt∼Di [t∈[ti,ti+]]
. It’s also clear that as  → 0, we have
Prt∼Di [t > ti + ] → Prt∼Di [t > ti] = 1 − Fi(ti), and Prt∼Di [t∈[ti,ti+]] →
1
fi(ti)
(the latter is simply the
definition of probability density).
A second valuable property of Myersonian virtual values is that they capture the “marginal revenue.”
That is, if the seller was selling to a single bidder at price just above (i.e. dv above) v, and decreased the
price to just below (i.e. dv below) v, the revenue would go up by exactly ϕ(v) · f(v)dv. We confirm that
discrete virtual values as per Definition 7 satisfy this property as well.
Observation 10. For any single-dimensional discrete distribution Di, we have ti · Prt∼Di [t ≥ ti] − t′i ·
Prt∼Di [t ≥ t′i] = fi(ti) · ϕi(ti), where t′i = mint>ti,t∈Ti{t}. In other words, ϕi(ti) captures the marginal
change in revenue as we go from setting price t′i to price ti.
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Proof. This follows immediately from the definition of ϕi(·). But to be thorough:
ti·Prt∼Di [t ≥ ti]
= ti ·
(
Prt∼Di [t ≥ t′i] + fi(ti)
)
(using that t′i = min
t>ti,t∈Ti
{t})
= t′i ·
(
Prt∼Di [t ≥ t′i] + fi(ti)
)− (t′i − ti) · (Prt∼Di [t ≥ t′i] + fi(ti))
= t′i · Prt∼Di [t ≥ t′i] + ti · fi(ti)− (t′i − ti) · Prt∼Di [t ≥ t′i]
= t′i · Prt∼Di [t ≥ t′i] + fi(ti) · ϕi(ti) (definition of ϕi(·))
We need one more definition specific to discrete type spaces before we can get back to the proof. A
little more specifically: Myerson’s payment identity, which shows that allocation rules uniquely determine
payments for any BIC mechanism over continuous type spaces, does not apply for all BIC mechanisms
when types are discrete. Fortunately, the payment identity still holds for any mechanism that might possibly
maximize revenue, but we need to be formal about this.
Definition 11. A BIC mechanism has proper payments if it is not possible to increase payments while
keeping the allocation rule the same without violating BIC. Formally, a BIC mechanism M = (pi, p) has
proper payments if for all i and all subsets S ⊆ Ti, and all  > 0, increasing pi(ti) by  for all ti ∈ S while
keeping pi the same does not result in a BIC mechanism. Note that all revenue-optimal mechanisms have
proper payments.
Lemma 12. Let pii(·) be monotone non-decreasing for all i. Then there exist {pi(·)}i∈[n] such that M =
(pi, p) is BIC and has proper payments.
Proof. For ease of notation in the proof, label the types in Ti so that 0 = t0i ≤ t1i < . . . < t|Ti|i (tji ∈ Ti for
j ∈ {1, . . . , |Ti|}). Then for a given pii(·), define:
pi(t
j
i ) =
j∑
k=1
tki · (pii(tki )− pii(tk−1i )).
We first claim that all tji are indifferent between telling the truth and reporting t
j−1
i . This is clear, as by
definition of pi(·) we have pi(tji ) = pi(tj−1i ) + tji · (pii(tji )− pii(tj−1i )), which implies:
tji · pii(tji )− pi(tji ) = tji · pii(tji )− pi(tj−1i )− tji · pii(tji ) + tji · pii(tj−1i ) = tji · pii(tj−1i )− pi(tj−1i ).
Now, consider any set S ⊆ Ti and any  > 0, and imagine raising the payments of all types t ∈ S by
. If we have tji ∈ S, tj−1i 6∈ S for any tji , then increasing all payments in S by  will cause tji to prefer
reporting tj−1i instead of telling the truth. So S must contain all of Ti, and in particular t
1
i . But if we increase
the payment of t1i by  > 0, we violate individual rationality, as we defined pi(t
1
i ) = t
1
i · pii(t1i ). So no such
S,  can exists, and M = (pi, p) has proper payments.
Finally, we just need to show that M is BIC. Notice that by definition of pi(·), for any j > k, we have
pi(t
j
i )−pi(tki ) ∈
[
tk+1i · (pii(tji )− pii(tki )), tji · (pii(tji )− pii(tki ))
]
. The lower bound corresponds to the case
that all the change from pii(tki ) to pii(t
j
i ) occurs going from t
k
i to t
k+1
i (i.e. pii(t
k+1
i ) = pii(t
j
i )), and the upper
bound corresponds to where all the change occurs going form tj−1i to t
j
i (i.e. pii(t
k
i ) = pii(t
j−1
i )).
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The lower bound directly implies that tki prefers telling the truth to reporting t
j
i as:
tki · (pii(tji )− pii(tki )) ≤ pi(tji )− pi(tki )⇒ tki · pii(tki )− pi(tki ) ≥ tki · pii(tji )− pi(tji ).
Similarly, the upper bound directly implies that tji prefers telling the truth to reporting t
k
i as:
tji · (pii(tji )− pii(tki )) ≥ pi(tji )− pi(tki )⇒ tji · pii(tji )− pi(tji ) ≥ tji · pii(tki )− pi(tki ).
As the above holds for any j > k, M is BIC.
4.2 Proof of Myerson’s Theorem via Duality
Now we return to our proof of Myerson’s Theorem. Let us first quickly confirm that indeed the resulting
ϕ˜i(·) by our ironing procedure is monotone:
Observation 13 ([Mye81]). ti > t′i ⇒ ϕ˜i(ti) ≥ ϕ˜i(t′i).
Proof. First, all types in the same ironed interval share the same ironed virtual value. So if ϕ˜i(·) is not
monotone non-decreasing, there exists two adjacent ironed intervals [x, y] and [z, w] such that x > w but
a([x, y]) < a([z, w]). Note that a([z, y]) = c · a([x, y]) + (1 − c) · a([z, w]) for some c ∈ (0, 1).20 Since
a([x, y]) < a([z, w]), we have a([z, y]) > a([x, y]). However, this contradicts with the choice of an ironed
interval for y as specified in Step 3 of the ironing process. Hence, no such ironed intervals exist and ϕ˜i(·) is
monotone non-decreasing.
And now, we can state Myerson’s theorem applied to discrete type spaces. Afterwards, we will provide
a proof using our new duality framework. One should map the theorem statement below to the statement
of Theorem 6 and see that our proof will essentially follow by providing a flow λ that induces a virtual
valuation function Φλi (·) = ϕi(·), another flow λ′ inducing Φλ
′
i (·) = ϕ˜i(·), and understanding which edges
have non-zero flow in each.
Theorem 14 ([Mye81]). For any BIC mechanism M = (pi, p), the revenue of M is less than or equal to the
virtual welfare of pi w.r.t. the virtual valuation function ϕ(·), and is less than or equal to the virtual welfare
of pi w.r.t. the ironed virtual valuation function ϕ˜(·). That is:
n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti) · pi(ti) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti) · pii(ti) · ϕi(ti). (3)
n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti) · pi(ti) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti) · pii(ti) · ϕ˜i(ti). (4)
Equality holds in Equation (3) whenever M has proper payments. Equality holds in Equation (4) if
and only if M has proper payments and pii(ti) = pii(t′i) for all ti ∼ t′i. Furthermore, the revenue-optimal
BIC mechanism awards the item to the bidder with the highest non-negative ironed virtual value (if one
exists), breaking ties arbitrarily but consistently across inputs.21 If no such bidder exists, the item remains
unallocated.
20In fact, c =
∑
t∈[x,y] fi(t)∑
t∈[z,y] fi(t)
.
21Breaking ties consistently means that for any two different inputs, as long as they have the same ironed virtual value profile,
the tie breaking should be the same.
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We first provide a canonical flow inducing Myerson’s virtual values as the virtual transformation. The
first two lemmas below relate to proving Equation (3). The third relates to proving Equation (4).
Lemma 15. Define λi(t′i, ti) = Prt∼Di [t > ti], where t′i = mint>ti,t∈Ti{t}, and λi(t, ti) = 0 for all t 6= t′i.
Then λ is a useful dual, and Φλi (ti) = ϕi(ti).
Proof. That λ is a useful dual follows immediately by considering the total flow in and flow out of any given
ti. The total flow in is equal to fi(ti) + Prt∼Di [t > ti]. This is because ti receives flow Prt∼Di [t > ti] from
t′i, and fi(ti) from the super source. The total flow out is equal to Prt∼Di [t ≥ ti], so the two are equal.
To compute Φλi (ti), simply plug the choice of λ into Definition 5.
Lemma 16. In any BIC mechanism M with proper payments, bidder i with type ti is indifferent between
reporting ti and t′i = maxt<ti,t∈Ti{t}.
Proof. We first recall that if M = (pi, p) is BIC, then pii(·) and pi(·) are both monotone non-decreasing
for all i [Mye81]. Because M is BIC, we know that t′i · pii(t′i) − pi(t′i) ≥ t′i · pii(t) − pi(t) for all t ∈ Ti.
Therefore, we also have:
t′i · (pii(t′i)− pii(t)) ≥ pi(t′i)− pi(t).
By monotonicity, the LHS above is non-negative whenever t′i > t. Therefore, ti · (pii(t′i) − pii(t)) ≥
pi(t
′
i) − pi(t) as well. This directly says that ti prefers reporting t′i to reporting any t < t′i. Assume now
for contradiction that there is some ti that is not indifferent between reporting ti and t′i. Then we have the
following chain of inequalities:
ti · pii(ti)− pi(ti) > ti · pii(t′i)− pi(t′i) ≥ ti · pii(t′)− pi(t′), ∀t′ < ti
⇒ti · (pii(ti)− pii(t′)) > pi(ti)− pi(t′), ∀t′ ≤ t′i
⇒t · (pii(ti)− pii(t′)) > pi(ti)− pi(t′), ∀t′ < ti, t ≥ ti
⇒t · pii(t)− pi(t) ≥ t · pii(ti)− pi(ti) > t · pii(t′)− pi(t′), ∀t′ < ti, t ≥ ti.
The last line explicitly states that all t ≥ ti strictly prefer telling the truth to reporting any t′ ≤ t′i. Therefore,
there exists a sufficiently small  > 0 such that if we increase all pi(t) by  for all t ≥ ti then M remains
BIC, contradicting that M has proper payments.
At this point, we have proved Equation (3) and the related statements for unironed virtual values (but we
will wrap up concretely at the end of the section). We now turn to Equation (4), and first show how to “fix”
non-monotonicities in virtual values by adding cycles.
Lemma 17. Starting from any flow λ and induced virtual values Φλ, adding a cycle of flow x between
bidder i’s type ti and type t′i < ti:
• Increases Φλi (ti).
• Decreases Φλi (t′i).
• Preserves fi(ti) · Φλi (ti) + fi(t′i) · Φλi (t′i).
Proof. Recall the definition of Φλi (ti) = ti +
∑
t(ti−t)λi(t,ti)
fi(ti)
. Adding a cycle of flow x between ti and t′i
increases λi(t′i, ti) and λi(ti, t
′
i), but otherwise doesn’t change λ. So Φ
λ
i (ti) increases by (ti − t′i)x/fi(ti).
Similarly, Φλi (t
′
i) decreases by exactly (ti−t′i)x/fi(t′i). It is therefore clear that fi(ti)·Φλi (ti)+fi(t′i)·Φλi (t′i)
preserved, as the changes are inversely proportional to the types’ densities.
And we may now conclude that a flow exists inducing Myerson’s ironed virtual values as well.
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Corollary 18. There exists a flow λ such that:
• Φλi (ti) = ϕ˜i(ti).
• λi(ti, t′i) > 0 whenever t′i = maxt<ti,t∈T {t}.
• λi(t′i, ti) > 0 when t′i = maxt<ti,t∈T {t} if and only if ti and t′i are in the same ironed interval.
• λi(t, t′) = 0 for all other t, t′.
Proof. Start with the λ inducing Φλi (ti) = ϕi(ti), and consider any ironed interval [x, y]. First, observe that
we must have ϕi(x) > a(x, y), as otherwise [x, y] would not be an ironed interval (as x doesn’t maximize
a(x, y), a(z, y) would be at least as large where z = mint>x,t∈Ti{t}, and recall that we would break a tie in
favor of z).
Now, add a cycle between x and z = mint>x,t∈Ti{t}. Per Lemma 17, this increases Φλi (z) and decreases
Φλi (x). So increase the weight along this cycle until Φ
λ
i (x) decreases to ϕ˜i(x). At this point, either [x, z]
is the entire ironed interval, in which case this interval is “finished.” Or, maybe z < y. In this case, we
claim that we can iterate the process with z. To see this, observe that by Lemma 17, we must have preserved
a(x, z). Observe again that we must have a(x, z) > a(x, y) in order for [x, y] to be an ironed interval, and
we have just set Φλi (x) = ϕ˜i(x) = a(x, y) < a(x, z), so we must have Φ
λ
i (z) > a(x, z) > a(x, y) = ϕ˜i(z).
So we can again add a cycle between z andw = mint>z,t∈Ti{t} to decrease Φλi (z) to ϕ˜i(z) while preserving
a(x,w). Iterating this process all the way until y necessarily adds a cycle between all adjacent types and
results in Φλi (t) = ϕ˜i(t) for all t ∈ [x, y], again by Lemma 17. Repeating this argument for all ironed
intervals proves the corollary.
Now we may complete the proof of Theorem 14. The bulk of the proof is captured by Lemma 15 and Corol-
lary 18, the only remaining work is to confirm the structure of the optimal mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 14: Inequality (3) now immediately follows from Theorem 6 and Lemma 15, and the
condition for it to be an equality is implied by Lemma 16. Inequality (4) follows immediately from Theo-
rem 6 and Corollary 18. Next, we argue why Inequality (4) is an equality when the stated condition holds.
When a mechanism is BIC and pii(ti) = pii(t′i), then pi(ti) = pi(t
′
i), because 0 = ti · (pii(ti) − pii(t′i)) ≥
pi(ti)− pi(t′i) ≥ t′i · (pii(ti)− pii(t′i)) = 0 (implied by the BIC constraints). Therefore, when the condition
holds, any bidder i with type ti is indifferent between reporting ti and any type t′i ∼ ti. Combining this
observation with Lemma 16, we know that for the flow specified in Corollary 18, all BIC constraints bind
between any two types ti and t′i with λ(ti, t
′
i) > 0. Thus, Inequality (4) is an equality when the condition
holds due to Theorem 6.
Finally, to see that the optimal mechanism has the prescribed format, observe that the allocation rule that
awards the item to the highest non-negative ironed virtual value clearly maximizes ironed virtual welfare.
So we get that the revenue of the optimal BIC mechanism is upper bounded by the ironed virtual welfare of
this allocation rule. Moreover, ironed virtual values are always monotone non-decreasing, so by Lemma 12,
this allocation rule has corresponding proper payments that combine to a BIC mechanism. Finally, because
the allocation rule by definition satisfies pii(ti) = pii(t′i) whenever ti ∼ t′i, we have that the revenue of this
mechanism is equal to its expected ironed virtual welfare (again by Theorem 6), and is therefore optimal (as
its expected ironed virtual welfare is an upper bound on the expected revenue of any BIC mechanism). 2
In summary, we have provided a duality-based proof of Myerson’s Theorem [Mye81]. This gives some
intuition for the flows we will develop in the following section. Also, it provides a different insight into
the difference between ironed and non-ironed virtual values. Expected revenue is equal to expected virtual
welfare for all BIC mechanisms (with proper payments) because the flow necessary to derive virtual values
only sends non-zero flow along edges that correspond to BIC constraints that are always tight. On the other
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hand, revenue is only upper bounded by ironed virtual welfare for all BIC mechanisms because the flow
necessary to derive ironed virtual values sends non-zero flow along all edges between adjacent types in
an equivalence class. So revenue is only equal to ironed virtual welfare if all of the corresponding BIC
constraints are tight (and there exist truthful mechanisms for which this doesn’t hold).
5 Canonical Flow and Virtual Valuation Function for Multiple Items
In this section, we present a canonical way to set the Lagrangian multipliers/flow that induces our bench-
marks for multi-item settings. This flow will use similar ideas to Section 4. Informally, our approach for a
single bidder first divides the entire type space of the bidder into regions based on their favorite item (that
is, argmaxj{vj}). We’ll then use a different “Myerson-like” flow within each region, described in more
detail shortly. For multiple bidders, we’ll still divide the type space of each bidder into regions based on
their favorite item, but define the “favorite” item slightly differently.
Specifically, let Pij(t−i) denote the price that bidder i could pay to receive exactly item j in the VCG
mechanism against bidders with types t−i.22 We will partition the type space Ti intom+1 regions: (i)R
(t−i)
0
contains all types ti such that tij < Pij(t−i), ∀j; (ii) R(t−i)j contains all types ti such that tij −Pij(t−i) ≥ 0
and j is the smallest index in argmaxk{tik−Pik(t−i)}. This partitions the types into subsets based on which
item provides the largest surplus (value minus price), and we break ties lexicographically. We’ll refer to the
largest surplus item as the bidder’s favorite item. We’ll refer to all other items as non-favorite items. For
any bidder i and any type profile t−i of everyone else, we define λ
(t−i)
i to be the following flow. The flow as
defined below will look similar to Myerson’s (non-ironed) virtual values, and we will need to similarly iron
it to accommodate irregular distributions.
For the remainder of this section, it will be helpful to have the above concrete definition ofR(t−i)j in mind
for defining our flows. However, all results proved in this section apply more broadly, for any definitions
of R(t−i)j which are upwards-closed. Subsequent work (e.g. [EFF
+17b]) has made use of these generalized
benchmarks.
Definition 19 (Upwards Closed Regions). We say that regions {R(t−i)j }j∈[m] are upwards-closed if for all
j ≥ 1, whenever v ∈ R(t−i)j , v + c · ej ∈ R(t−i)j for any c ≥ 0 as well. Here, ej denotes the jth standard
basis vector in the m-dimensional Euclidean space.
In this section, we state/prove our results for arbitrary upwards-closed regions. In subsequent sections,
we will instantiate R(t−i)j as defined in the previous paragraphs.
Definition 20 (Initial Canonical Flow). Define our initial canonical flow to be the following:
1. ∀j > 0, any flow entering R(t−i)j is from s (the super source) and any flow leaving R(t−i)j is to ∅
(super sink).
2. For every type ti in region R
(t−i)
0 , the flow goes directly to ∅. That is, λi(ti,∅) = fi(ti) for all
ti ∈ R(t−i)0 .
3. For every type ti in region R
(t−i)
j , define type t
′
i such that t
′
ij = maxt<tij ,t∈Tij{t}, and t′ik = tik for
all k 6= j.
• If t′i ∈ R(t−i)j as well, then set λi(ti, t′i) =
∑
t∗i : t
∗
ik=tik ∀k 6=j ∧ t∗ij≥tij fi(t
∗
i ).
22Note that when buyers are additive, this is exactly the highest bid for item j from buyers besides i. When buyers are unit-
demand, buyer i only ever buys one item, and this is the price she would pay for receiving j.
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• If t′i /∈ R(t−i), set λi(ti,∅) =
∑
t∗i : t
∗
ik=tik ∀k 6=j ∧ t∗ij≥tij fi(t
∗
i ).
Observe that this indeed defines a flow. All nodes in R(t−i)0 have no flow in (except from the super
source), and send exactly this flow to the super sink. All other nodes get flow in from exactly one type
(in addition to the super source) and send flow out to exactly one type, and the flow is balanced, just as in
Lemma 15. At a high level, what we are doing is restricting attention to a single item and attempting to
use the canonical single item flow for just this item. We restrict attention to different items for different
types, depending on the region in which ti lies (for our later instantiation, this depends on which item gives
them highest utility at the prices Pij(t−i)). Let’s first study the induced virtual values Φ
(t−i)
ik (ti) for when
ti /∈ R(t−i)k .
Claim 21. For any type ti ∈ R(t−i)j , its corresponding virtual value Φ(t−i)ik (ti) for item k is exactly its value
tik for all k 6= j.
Proof. By the definition of Φ(t−i)i (·) , Φ(t−i)ik (ti) = tik− 1fi(ti)
∑
t′i
λ
(t−i)
i (t
′
i, ti)(t
′
ik−tik). Since ti ∈ Rj , by
the definition of the flow λ(t−i)i , for any t
′
i such that λ
(t−i)
i (t
′
i, ti) > 0, t
′
ik − tik = 0 for all k 6= j, therefore
Φ
(t−i)
ik (ti) = tik.
Let’s now study the corresponding Φ(t−i)ij (ti) for this flow when ti ∈ R(t−i)j . This turns out to be closely
related to the Myerson’s virtual value function for single-dimensional distributions discussed in Section 4.
For each i, j, we use ϕij(·) and ϕ˜ij(·) to denote the Myerson virtual value and ironed virtual value function
for distribution Dij respectively, as defined in Section 4.
Claim 22. For any type ti ∈ R(t−i)j , then the initial canonical flow induces virtual values satisfying:
Φ
(t−i)
ij (ti) = ϕij(tij) = tij −
(t′ij−tij)·Prt∼Dij [t>tij ]
fij(tij)
, where t′ij = mint>tij ,t∈Tij{t}.
Proof. Let us fix ti,−j , and prove this is true for all choices of ti,−j . If tij is the largest value in Tij , then
there is no flow coming into it except the one from the source, so Φ(t−i)ij (ti) = tij . For every other value
of tij , the flow coming from its predecessor (t′ij , ti,−j) is exactly (note below that several steps make use of
the fact that fi(ti) =
∏
j fij(tij))∑
t∗i : t
∗
ik=tik∀k 6=j ∧ t∗ij≥t′ij
fi(t
∗
i ) =
∑
t∗i : t
∗
ik=tik∀k 6=j ∧ t∗ij≥t′ij
fij(t
∗
ij) ·
∏
k 6=j
fik(tik) =
∏
k 6=j
fik(tik) ·
∑
t∗ij>tij
fij(t
∗
ij)
=
∏
k 6=j
fik(tik) · Pr
t∼Dij
[t > tij ].
Now, we can compute according to Definition 5:
Φ
(t−i)
ij (ti) = tij−
(t′ij − tij) ·
∏
k 6=j fik(tik) · Prt∼Dij [t > tij ]
fi(ti)
= tij−
(t′ij − tij) · Prt∼Dij [t > tij ]
fij(tij)
= ϕij(tij)
Claims 21 and 22 show that our initial canonical flow induces virtual values such that the virtual value
of each bidder for all of their non-favorite items is exactly their value, while their virtual value for their
favorite item is exactly their Myersonian virtual value as per Definition 7. When Dij is regular, this is the
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canonical flow we use. When the distribution is not regular, we also need to “iron” the virtual values as in
Section 4. Essentially all we are doing is applying the same procedure as Definition 8, but we repeat it below
to be clear exactly how the substitutions occur. Below, we use ϕ˜∗ij to denote the ironed virtual values instead
of ϕ˜ij because we reserve ϕ˜ij to refer exactly to the ironed virtual values that result in the single item case,
and we haven’t yet proved that they are (essentially) the same.
Definition 23 (Ironed Canonical Virtual Values). For a given bidder i, valuation vector ti ∈ R(t−i)j , ob-
tain the ironed canonical values, ϕ˜∗ij(·) in the following manner: let X denote the minimum tij such that
(tij ; ti,−j) ∈ R(t−i)j . Let ∼∗ be an equivalence relation on Tij . We say that an interval [t∗ij , tij ] is ironed if
t ∼∗ t′ for all t, t′ ∈ [t∗ij , tij ].
1. Initialize tij = maxt∈Tij{t}, the highest un-ironed type.
2. For any t ∈ [X, tij ], define the average virtual value a([t, tij ]) =
∑
t′∈[t,tij ] fij(t
′)·ϕij(t′)∑
t′∈[t,tij ] fij(t
′) .
3. Let t∗i maximize the average virtual value. That is, t
∗
ij = arg maxt∈[X,tij ]{a([t, tij ])} (break ties in
favor of the maximum such t∗ij).
4. Update ϕ˜∗ij(t) = a([t
∗
ij , tij ]) for all t ∈ [t∗ij , tij ].
5. Update t ∼∗ t′ for all t, t′ ∈ [t∗ij , tij ].
6. Update tij = maxt∈[X,t∗ij),t∈Ti{t}, the highest un-ironed type.
7. Return to Step 2.
Lemma 24. The initial canonical flow can be ironed into a λ so that for all j, and all ti ∈ R(t−i)j , Φλij(ti) =
ϕ˜∗ij(tij) by only adding cycles between types ti, t
′
i ∈ R(t−i)j satisfying ti,−j = t′i,−j .
Proof. Exactly the same as Corollary 18, plus the observation that all types for which values for item j have
identical values for items 6= j.
Now that we have a flow “ironing” one of the virtual values, we want to wrap up by observing that
ϕ˜∗ij(v) ≤ ϕ˜ij(v) for all v (where ϕ˜ij(v) is Myerson’s ironed virtual value for the distribution Dij .
Lemma 25. For any i, j, t−i, ti,−j , tij , ϕ˜∗ij(tij) ≤ ϕ˜ij(tij).
Proof. Observe that the ironing procedure in Definition 23 is nearly identical to that of Definition 8. In fact,
for all x, y ≥ X (X is defined in Definition 23), if x ∼∗ y as in Definition 23, then x ∼ y as in Definition 8.
This immediately yields that ϕ˜ij(tij) = ϕ˜∗ij(tij) for all tij in ironed intervals [x, y] (as in Definition 8) such
that x ≥ X . But the ironed virtual values might differ if tij lies inside an ironed interval that is “cut” by
X in Definition 8. But observe that by the definition of ironing, we necessarily have a([x, y]) ≥ a([X, y])
in order for [x, y] to possibly be an ironed interval containing X . Therefore, we may immediately conclude
that ϕ˜ij(tij) ≥ ϕ˜∗ij(tij) for all tij , even those in ironed intervals cut by X .
Lemma 26. Let {R(t−i)j }j∈[m] define upwards-closed regions. Then there exists a flow λ(t−i)i such that
Φ
(t−i)
ij (ti) satisfies the following properties:
• For any j > 0, ti ∈ R(t−i)j , Φ(t−i)ij (ti) ≤ ϕ˜ij(tij), where ϕ˜ij(·) is Myerson’s ironed virtual value for
Dij .
• For any j, ti ∈ R(t−i)j , Φ(t−i)ik (ti) = tik for all k 6= j. In particular, Φ(t−i)i (ti) = ti, ∀ti ∈ R(t−i)0 .
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Figure 3: An example of λ (with ironing) for a single bidder.
Proof. To see the first bullet, combine Lemmas 24 and 25. To see the second bullet, observe Claim 21,
combined with the fact that the cycles added via Lemma 24 doesn’t affect virtual values for the non-favorite
items.
Corollary 27. Let {R(t−i)j }j∈[m] define upwards-closed regions. Then for any BIC mechanism with (pi, p)
as its reduced form:
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti) · pi(ti) ≤
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti) ·
(
tij · 1
[
ti /∈ R(t−i)j
]
+ ϕ˜ij(tij) · 1
[
ti ∈ R(t−i)j
])
Corollary 27 upper bounds the optimal revenue for arbitrary upwards-closed regions. Corollary 28
further relaxes this upper bound by considering the pi which maximizes expected Virtual Welfare for additive
bidders. Note that the relaxation below has been used in follow-up works (e.g. [EFF+17b]) for additive
bidders, but is a very loose relaxation for unit-demand bidders.
Corollary 28. Let {R(t−i)j }j∈[m] define upwards-closed regions. Then:
REV(D) ≤ E~v∼D
∑
j
max
i
{
tij · 1
[
ti /∈ R(t−i)j
]
+ ϕ˜ij(tij) · 1
[
ti ∈ R(t−i)j
]} .
Now we instantiate the specific choice of regions and flows for our canonical flow. At this point, for
each t−i ∈ T−i, we have defined a different flow for bidder i. We have shown that this flow induces a virtual
valuation function such that bidder i’s virtual value for all non-favorite items is equal to their value for those
items, and their virtual value for their favorite item is at most their Myersonian ironed virtual value for that
item. Figure 3 contains a diagram illustrating our flow for a single bidder, and Figure 4 illustrates what the
flow might look like for non-zero (t−i).
Finally, note that we’ve defined many possible flows for bidder i: each t−i defines different Pij(t−i)s,
which in turn define different R(t−i)j s, which define different flows. But we only get to pick one flow for
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Figure 4: An example of λ(t−i)i for two items.
bidder i, and it cannot change depending on t−i. The flow that we will finally use essentially averages these
flows according to D−i.
Definition 29 (Canonical Flow for Multiple Items). Our flow for bidder i is λi =
∑
t−i∈T−i f−i(t−i)λ
(t−i)
i .
Accordingly, the virtual value function Φi of λi is Φi(·) =
∑
t−i∈T−i f−i(t−i)Φ
(t−i)
i (·).
Intuition behind Our Flow: The social welfare is a trivial upper bound for revenue, which can be arbitrarily
bad in the worst case. To design a good benchmark, we want to replace some of the terms that contribute
the most to the social welfare with more manageable ones. The flow λ(t−i)i aims to achieve exactly this. For
each bidder i, we find the item j that contributes the most to the social welfare when awarded to i. Then
we turn the virtual value of item j into its Myerson’s single-dimensional (ironed) virtual value, and keep
the virtual value of all the other items equal to the value. This transformation is feasible only if we know
exactly t−i and could use a different dual solution for each t−i. Since we can’t, a natural idea is to define a
flow by taking an expectation over t−i. This is indeed our flow.
We conclude this section with one final lemma and our main theorem regarding the canonical flow. Both
proofs are immediate corollaries of the flow definition and Theorem 6. Note also that our flow only ever
sends flow between types that are identical on all but one coordinate, and adjacent in the final coordinate
(and that this coordinate is their “favorite” item - adjusted by t−i). This means that our benchmark not only
upper bounds the optimal revenue of any BIC mechanism, but it also upper bounds the optimal revenue of
any (non-truthful) mechanism where bidder i with type ti has no incentive to lie by misreporting their value
for a single item to an adjacent value. A corollary of our work in the following sections is that this relaxation
does not improve the optimal revenue by more than a constant factor.
Lemma 30. For all i, j, ti, Φij(ti) ≤ tij · Prv−i∼D−i
[
ti /∈ R(v−i)j
]
+ ϕ˜ij(tij) · Prv−i∼D−i
[
ti ∈ R(v−i)j
]
.
Theorem 31. Let M be any BIC mechanism with
(
pi, p
)
as its reduced form. The expected revenue of M
is upper bounded by the expected virtual welfare of the same allocation rule with respect to the canonical
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virtual value function Φi(·). In particular,∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti) · pi(ti) ≤
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti) · Φij(ti)
≤
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti) ·
(
tij · Pr
v−i∼D−i
[
ti /∈ R(v−i)j
]
+ ϕ˜ij(tij) · Pr
v−i∼D−i
[
ti ∈ R(v−i)j
])
(5)
6 Warm Up: Single Bidder
As a warm up, we start with the single bidder case. In this section, our goal is to show how to use the
bounds obtained via Theorem 31 to prove that simple mechanisms are approximately optimal for a single
additive or unit-demand bidder with independent item values, recovering results of [CMS15] and [BILW14].
Throughout this section, we keep the same notations but drop the subscript i and superscript (t−i) whenever
is appropriate.
Canonical Flow for a Single Bidder. Since the canonical flow and the corresponding virtual valuation
functions are defined based on other bidders types t−i, let us see how it is simplified when there is only a
single bidder. First, the VCG prices are all 0, therefore λ is simply one flow instead of a distribution of
different flows. Second, for the same reason, the region R0 is empty and region Rj contains all types t with
tj ≥ tk for all k (see Figure 3 for an example). This simplifies Expression (5) to∑
t∈T
∑
j
f(t) · pij(t) ·
(
tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ] + ϕ˜j(tj) · 1[t ∈ Rj ]
)
=
∑
t∈T
∑
j
f(t) · pij(t) · tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ] (NON-FAVORITE)
+
∑
t∈T
∑
j
f(t) · pij(t) · ϕ˜j(tj) · 1[t ∈ Rj ] (SINGLE)
Above, SINGLE refers to the bound coming from cases where t ∈ Rj . We name it “single” to reference
the connection to single-dimensional settings. NON-FAVORITE refers to the bound coming from cases where
t /∈ Rj , and we name it “non-favorite” because this contribution only comes from non-favorite items. We
bound SINGLE below, and NON-FAVORITE differently for unit-demand and additive valuations.
Lemma 32. For any feasible pi(·), SINGLE ≤ OPTCOPIES.
Proof. Assume M is the mechanism that induces pi(·). Consider another mechanism M ′ for the Copies
setting, such that for every type profile t, M ′ serves agent j iff M allocates item j in the original setting and
t ∈ Rj . As M is feasible in the original setting, M ′ is clearly feasible in the Copies setting. When agent
j’s type is tj , its probability of being served in M ′ is
∑
t−j f−j(t−j) · pij(tj , t−j) · 1[t ∈ Rj ] for all j and
tj . Therefore, SINGLE is the ironed virtual welfare achieved by M ′ with respect to ϕ˜(·). Since the copies
setting is a single dimensional setting, the optimal revenue OPTCOPIES equals the maximum ironed virtual
welfare, thus no smaller than SINGLE. Note that this proof makes use of the assumption that item values are
independent, as otherwise Myerson’s theory doesn’t apply.
Upper Bound for a Unit-demand Bidder. As mentioned previously, the bulk of our work is in obtaining a
benchmark and properly decomposing it. Now that we have a decomposition, we can use techniques similar
to those of Chawla et al. [CHK07, CHMS10, CMS15] to approximate each term.
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Lemma 33. When the types are unit-demand, for any feasible pi(·), NON-FAVORITE ≤ OPTCOPIES.
Proof. Indeed, we will prove that NON-FAVORITE is upper bounded by the revenue of the VCG mechanism
in the Copies setting. Define S(t) to be the second largest number in {t1, · · · , tm}. When the types are
unit-demand, the Copies setting is a single item auction with m bidders. Therefore, if we run the Vickrey
auction in the Copies setting, the revenue is
∑
t∈T f(t) · S(t). If t /∈ Rj , then there exists some k 6= j
such that tk ≥ tj , so tj · 1[t ∈ Rj ] ≤ S(t) for all j. Therefore,
∑
t∈T
∑
j f(t) · pij(t) · tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ] ≤∑
t∈T
∑
j f(t) · pij(t) · S(t) ≤
∑
t∈T f(t) · S(t). The last inequality is because the bidder is unit demand,
so
∑
j pij(t) ≤ 1.
Combining Lemma 32 and Lemma 33, we recover the result of Chawla et al. [CMS15]:23
Theorem 34. For a single unit-demand bidder, the optimal revenue is upper bounded by 2OPTCOPIES.
Upper Bound for an Additive Bidder. When the bidder is additive, we need to further decompose NON-
FAVORITE into two terms we call CORE and TAIL. For simplicity of notation in the proofs that follow, define
r = SREV. Again, we remind the reader that most of our work is already done in obtaining our decomposi-
tion. The remaining portion of the proof is indeed inspired by prior work of Babaioff et al. [BILW14].24
∑
t∈T
∑
j
f(t) · pij(t) · tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ] ≤
∑
t∈T
∑
j
f(t) · tj · 1[t /∈ Rj ]
=
∑
j
∑
tj>r
fj(tj) · tj ·
∑
t−j
f−j(t−j) · 1[t /∈ Rj ] +
∑
j
∑
tj≤r
fj(tj) · tj ·
∑
t−j
f−j(t−j) · 1[t /∈ Rj ]
≤
∑
j
∑
tj>r
fj(tj) · tj · Pr
t−j∼D−j
[t /∈ Rj ] (TAIL) +
∑
j
∑
tj≤r
fj(tj) · tj (CORE)
Before proceeding, let’s parse term TAIL above (we’ll parse CORE shortly after). TAIL captures contri-
butions to the bound coming from non-favorite items whose value is at least SREV. In the term TAIL, the
main idea is that we should expect tj ·Pr[t /∈ Rj ] to be small when tj > SREV. This is because tj is already
quite large, so we should expect the probability that we see another item with even larger value (a necessary
condition for t /∈ Rj) to be quite small. Lemma 35 captures this formally, and makes use of the fact that
item values are independent.
Lemma 35. TAIL ≤ SREV.
Proof. (Recall that we define r = SREV for ease of notation in some places). By the definition of Rj , for
any given tj ,
Pr
t−j∼D−j
[t /∈ Rj ] ≤ Pr
t−j∼D−j
[∃k 6= j, tk ≥ tj ].25
It is clear that by setting price tj on each item separately, we can make revenue at least tj ·Prt−j∼D−j [∃k 6=
j, tk ≥ tj ], as the buyer will certainly choose to purchase something at price tj whenever there is an item
she values above tj . So we see that therefore SREV ≥ tj · Prt−j∼D−j [t /∈ Rj ], for all tj . Thus, TAIL
≤ SREV·∑j∑tj>r fj(tj) = ∑j SREV·Prtj∼Dj [tj > SREV] = the revenue of selling each item separately
at price SREV, which by the same exact reasoning is also ≤ SREV.
23This bound combined with [CHMS10] recovers the state-of-the-art 4-approximation via item-pricing.
24The resulting 6-approximation is roughly the state of the art - subsequent works have improved the analysis of the same
mechanism to guarantee a 5.2-approximation [MSL15].
25If not for issues of tie-breaking, this would be equality.
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Now, let’s parse CORE. CORE captures contibutions to the bound coming from non-favorite items whose
value is at most SREV. The main idea is that CORE is the expected sum of independent random variables,
each supported on [0, SREV]. So maybe CORE = O(SREV), which is great. Or, maybe CORE >> SREV,
in which case it should concentrate (due to being the sum of “small” independent random variables). In
the latter case, we should expect to have BREV = Ω(CORE), which is also great. Lemma 36 states this
formally, and also makes use of the fact that item values are independent.
Lemma 36. If we sell the grand bundle at price CORE − 2r, the bidder will purchase it with probability at
least 1/2. In other words, BREV ≥ CORE2 − r, or CORE ≤ 2BREV + 2SREV.
Proof. We will first need a technical lemma (also used in [BILW14], but proved here for completeness).
Lemma 37. Let x be a positive single dimensional random variable drawn from F of finite support,26 such
that for any number a, a ·Prx∼F [x ≥ a] ≤ B where B is an absolute constant. Then for any positive number
s, the second moment of the random variable xs = x · 1[x ≤ s] is upper bounded by 2B · s.
Proof. Let {a1, . . . , a`} be the intersection of the support of F and [0, s], and a0 = 0.
E[x2s] =
∑`
k=0
Pr
x∼F
(x = ak) · a2k
=
∑`
k=1
(a2k − a2k−1) ·
∑`
d=k
Pr
x∼F
(x = ad)
≤
∑`
k=1
(a2k − a2k−1) · Pr
x∼F
[x ≥ ak]
≤
∑`
k=1
2(ak − ak−1) · ak · Pr
x∼F
[x ≥ ak]
≤2B ·
∑`
k=1
(ak − ak−1)
≤2B · s
The penultimate inequality is because ak · Prx∼F [x ≥ ak] ≤ B.
Now with Lemma 37, for each j define a new random variable cj based on the following procedure:
draw a sample vj from Dj , if vj lies in [0, r], then cj = vj , otherwise cj = 0. Let c =
∑
j cj . It is not hard
to see that we have E[c] =
∑
j
∑
tj≤r fj(tj) · tj . Now we are going to show that c concentrates because
it has small variance. Since the cj’s are independent, Var[c] =
∑
j Var[cj ] ≤
∑
j E[c2j ]. We will bound
each E[c2j ] separately. Let rj = maxx{x · Prtj∼Dj [tj ≥ x]}. By Lemma 37, we can upper bound E[c2j ] by
2rj · r. On the other hand, it is easy to see that r =
∑
j rj (as this is exactly the definition of SREV), so
Var[c] ≤ 2r2. By the Chebyshev inequality,
Pr[c < E[c]− 2r] ≤ Var[c]
4r2
≤ 1
2
.
26The same statement holds for continuous distribution as well, and can be proved using integration by parts.
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Therefore,
Pr
t∼D
[
∑
j
tj ≥ E[c]− 2r] ≥ Pr[c ≥ E[c]− 2r] ≥ 1
2
.
So BREV ≥ E[c]−2r2 , as we can sell the grand bundle at price E[c] − 2r, and it will be purchased with
probability at least 1/2.
Theorem 38. For a single additive bidder, the optimal revenue is ≤ 2BREV + 4SREV.
Proof. Combining Lemma 32, 35 and 36, the optimal revenue is upper bounded by OPTCOPIES+SREV +
2BREV + 2SREV. It is not hard to see that OPTCOPIES= SREV, because the optimal auction in the copies
setting just sells everything separately. So the optimal revenue is upper bounded by 2BREV + 4SREV.
7 Multiple Bidders
In this section, we show how to use the upper bound in Theorem 31 to show that deterministic DSIC mech-
anisms can achieve a constant fraction of the (randomized) optimal BIC revenue in multi-bidder settings
when the bidders valuations are all unit-demand or additive. Before beginning, we remind the reader of
some notation from Section 2: VCG(D) refers to the revenue of the VCG mechanism when buyers have
values drawn from D, and BVCG refers to the revenue of the optimal “VCG with entry fees” mechanism.
OPTCOPIES(D) refers to the optimal achievable revenue in the related single-dimensional “copies” setting,
where each buyer has been split into m different buyers (one for each item).
Similar to the single bidder case, we first decompose the upper bound (Expression 5) into three com-
ponents and bound them separately. In the last expression in what follows, we call the first term NON-
FAVORITE, the second term UNDER and the third term SINGLE. We further break NON-FAVORITE into
two parts, OVER and SURPLUS and bound them separately. The following are the approximation factors we
achieve:
Theorem 39. For multiple unit-demand bidders, the optimal revenue is upper bounded by 4OPTCOPIES.
Theorem 40. For multiple additive bidders, the optimal revenue is upper bounded by 6OPTCOPIES+2BVCG.
Note that a simple posted-price mechanism achieves revenue OPTCOPIES/6 when all buyers are unit-
demand [CHMS10, KW12], and selling each item separately using Myerson’s auction achieves revenue
OPTCOPIES when buyers are additive. Therefore, the CHMS/KW [CHMS10, KW12] posted-price mech-
anism achieves a 24-approximation to the optimal BIC mechanism (previously, it was known to be a 30-
approximation), and Yao’s approximation ratios [Yao15] are improved from 69 to 8. Some parts of the
following analysis draw inspiration from prior works of Chawla et al. [CHMS10] and Yao [Yao15], how-
ever, much of the analysis also represents new techniques. In particular, it is worth pointing out that our
proof of Theorem 40 looks similar to our single-bidder case, whereas Yao’s original proof required the en-
tirely new machinery of “β-adjusted revenue” and “β-exclusive mechanisms.” Below is our decomposition,
first into NON-FAVORITE, UNDER, and SINGLE, then further decomposing NON-FAVORITE into OVER and
SURPLUS. Recall that ∧ refers to “AND” and ∨ refers to “OR.”
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∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti) ·
(
tij · Pr
v−i∼D−i
[ti /∈ R(v−i)j ] + ϕ˜ij(tij) · Pr
v−i∼D−i
[ti ∈ R(v−i)j ]
)
≤
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti) ·
∑
v−i∈T−i
tijf−i(v−i) · 1
[(∃k 6= j, tik − Pik(v−i) ≥ tij − Pij(v−i)) ∨ (tij < Pij(v−i))]
+
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti)piij(ti)ϕ˜ij(tij) Pr
v−i∼D−i
[ti ∈ R(v−i)j ]
≤
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti)·∑
v−i∈T−i
tijf−i(v−i) · 1
[(∃k 6= j, tik − Pik(v−i) ≥ tij − Pij(v−i)) ∧ (tij ≥ Pij(v−i))] (NON-FAVORITE)
+
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti) ·
∑
v−i∈T−i
tij · f−i(v−i) · 1[tij < Pij(v−i)] (UNDER)
+
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti) · ϕ˜ij(tij) · Pr
v−i∼D−i
[ti ∈ R(v−i)j ] (SINGLE)
NON-FAVORITE ≤
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti) ·
∑
v−i∈T−i
Pij(v−i)f−i(v−i)1[tij ≥ Pij(v−i)] (OVER)
+
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti)·∑
v−i∈T−i
(tij − Pij(v−i)) · f−i(v−i) · 1
[(∃k 6= j, tik − Pik(v−i) ≥ tij − Pij(v−i)) ∧ (tij ≥ Pij(v−i))] (SURPLUS)
Before continuing, let’s try to parse these five terms:
• All terms sum over all bidders, all types, and all items, and take the density of that type times the
interim probability that bidder receives that item when reporting that type, times some portion of the
virtual valuation for that item.
• NON-FAVORITE takes the value for the item, times the probability that it is not the bidder’s favorite
item, as defined in Section 5, when v−i is drawn from D−i (roughly corresponds to items k such that
ti ∈ R(v−i)j for j 6= k, but not perfectly).
• UNDER takes the value for the item, times the probability that the bidder is not even willing to pur-
chase the item at the VCG prices defined by v−i drawn from D−i (roughly corresponds to when
ti ∈ R(v−i)0 , but not perfectly).
• SINGLE takes the Myerson Ironed Virtual Value for the item, times the probability that it is the
bidder’s favorite item (corresponds to items j such that ti ∈ R(v−i)j ).
• OVER and SURPLUS split NON-FAVORITE in the following way:
– OVER replaces the value in NON-FAVORITE with the VCG price induced by v−i (and also upper
bounds some probabilities by 1). This roughly corresponds to the revenue obtained by VCG (but
not perfectly).
– SURPLUS replaces the value in NON-FAVORITE with (value - VCG price induced by v−i), and
roughly corresponds to the bidder’s utility for participating in the VCG auction (but not per-
fectly).
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– Observe that value = VCG price + (value - VCG price), so this is indeed a decomposition of
Non-Favorite.
The plan of attack is as follows: SINGLE will be handled the same way as in Section 6. SURPLUS
will be handled similarly to NON-FAVORITE from Section 6, and both parts yield the same approximation
guarantees as their single-bidder counterparts. That leaves UNDER and OVER, which we will show each
contribute at most an additional OPTCOPIES, and account for the “plus two” in transitioning from single-
bidder to multi-bidder bounds. We now proceed to address these terms formally, beginning with SURPLUS.
Analyzing SURPLUS for Unit-demand Bidders: The proof of this lemma is similar in spirit to Lemma 33.
Lemma 41. When the types are unit-demand, for any feasible pi(·), SURPLUS ≤ OPTCOPIES.
Proof. Indeed, we will prove that SURPLUS is bounded above by the revenue of the VCG mechanism in the
Copies setting. For any i define Si(ti, v−i) to be the second largest number in {ti1 − Pi1(v−i), · · · , tim −
Pim(v−i)}. Now consider running the VCG mechanism on type profile (ti, v−i). An agent (i, j) is served in
the VCG mechanism in the Copies setting, iff item j is allocated to i in the VCG mechanism in the original
setting, which is equivalent to saying tij − Pij(v−i) ≥ 0 and tij − Pij(v−i) ≥ tik − Pik(v−i) for all k. The
Copies setting is single-dimensional, therefore any agent’s payment is her threshold bid. For agent (i, j), her
threshold bid is Pij(v−i) + max{0,maxk 6=j tik−Pik(v−i)} which is at least Si(ti, v−i). On the other hand,
for any i, whenever ∃j′, tij′ − Pij′(v−i) ≥ 0, there exists some ji such that (i, ji) is served in the VCG
mechanism. Combining the two conclusions above, we show that on any profile (ti, v−i), the payment in the
VCG mechanism collected from agents in {(i, j)}j∈[m] is at least Si(ti, v−i) · 1[∃j′, tij′ − Pij′(v−i) ≥ 0].
So the total revenue of the VCG Copies mechanism is at least:∑
i
∑
(ti,v−i)∈Ti
f(ti, v−i) · Si(ti, v−i) · 1[∃j′, tij′ − Pij′(v−i) ≥ 0].
Next we argue for any j and (ti, v−i), the following inequality holds.
(tij − Pij(v−i)) · 1
[(∃k 6= j, tik − Pik(v−i) ≥ tij − Pij(v−i) ≥ 0]
≤ Si(ti, v−i) · 1[∃j′, tij′ − Pij′(v−i) ≥ 0] (6)
We only need to consider the case when the LHS is non-zero. In that case, the RHS has value Si(ti, v−i),
and also there exists some k such that tik − Pik(v−i) ≥ tij − Pij(v−i), so tij − Pij(v−i) ≤ Si(ti, v−i).
So now we can rewrite SURPLUS and upper bound it with the revenue of the VCG mechanism in the
Copies setting.∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti)
∑
v−i∈T−i
(tij − Pij(v−i)) · f−i(v−i) · 1
[
∃k 6= j, tik − Pik(v−i) ≥ tij − Pij(v−i) ≥ 0
]
=
∑
i
∑
(ti,v−i)∈Ti
f(ti, v−i)
∑
j
piij(ti) · (tij − Pij(v−i)) · 1
[
∃k 6= j, tik − Pik(v−i) ≥ tij − Pij(v−i) ≥ 0
]
≤
∑
i
∑
(ti,v−i)∈Ti
f(ti, v−i)
∑
j
piij(ti) · Si(ti, v−i) · 1[∃j′, tij′ − Pij′(v−i) ≥ 0] (Inequality (6))
≤
∑
i
∑
(ti,v−i)∈Ti
f(ti, v−i) · Si(ti, v−i) · 1[∃j′, tij′ − Pij′(v−i) ≥ 0] (
∑
j
piij(ti) ≤ 1 ∀i, ti)
The last line is upper bounded by the revenue of the VCG mechanism in the Copies setting by our work
above, which is clearly upper bounded by OPTCOPIES.
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Analyzing SURPLUS for Additive Bidders: Similar to the single bidder case, we will again break the
term SURPLUS into the CORE and the TAIL, and analyze them separately. Before we proceed, we first
define the cutoffs. Let rij(v−i) = maxx≥Pij(v−i){x · Prtij∼Dij [tij ≥ x]}. The observant reader will notice
that this is bidder i’s ex-ante payment for item j in Ronen’s single-item mechanism [Ron01] conditioned
on other bidders types being v−i, but this connection is not necessary to understand the proof. Further
let ri(v−i) =
∑
j rij(v−i), ri = Ev−i∼D−i [ri(v−i)] and r =
∑
i ri, the expected revenue of running
Ronen’s mechanism separately for each item (again, the connection to Ronen’s mechanism is not necessary
to understand the proof). We first bound TAIL and CORE, using arguments similar to the single item case
(Lemmas 35 and 36),
SURPLUS ≤
∑
i
∑
v−i∈T−i
f−i(v−i)
∑
j
∑
tij≥Pij(v−i)
fij(tij) · (tij − Pij(v−i)) ·
∑
ti,−j∈Ti,−j
fi,−j(ti,−j)·
1[∃k 6= j, tik − Pik(v−i) ≥ tij − Pij(v−i)]
=
∑
i
∑
v−i∈T−i
f−i(v−i)
∑
j
∑
tij≥Pij(v−i)
fij(tij)·
(tij − Pij(v−i)) · Pr
ti,−j∼Di,−j
[∃k 6= j, tik − Pik(v−i) ≥ tij − Pij(v−i)]
≤
∑
i
∑
v−i∈T−i
f−i(v−i)
∑
j
∑
tij>Pij(v−i)+ri(v−i)
fij(tij)·
(tij − Pij(v−i)) · Pr
ti,−j∼Di,−j
[∃k 6= j, tik − Pik(v−i) ≥ tij − Pij(v−i)] (TAIL)
+
∑
i
∑
v−i∈T−i
f−i(v−i)
∑
j
∑
tij∈[Pij(v−i),Pij(v−i)+ri(v−i)]
fij(tij) · (tij − Pij(v−i)) (CORE)
Lemma 42. TAIL ≤ r.
Proof. First, by union bound
Pr
ti,−j∼Di,−j
[∃k 6= j, tik − Pik(v−i) ≥ tij − Pij(v−i)] ≤
∑
k 6=j
Pr
tik∼Dik
[ tik − Pik(v−i) ≥ tij − Pij(v−i)].
By the definition of rik(v−i), we certainly have rik(v−i) ≥ (Pik(v−i) + tij − Pij(v−i)) · Prtik∼Dik [ tik −
Pik(v−i) ≥ tij − Pij(v−i)], so we can also derive:
Pr
tik∼Dik
[ tik − Pik(v−i) ≥ tij − Pij(v−i)] ≤ rik(v−i)
Pik(v−i) + tij − Pij(v−i) ≤
rik(v−i)
tij − Pij(v−i) .
Using these two inequalities, we can upper bound TAIL:
∑
i
∑
v−i∈T−i
f−i(v−i)
∑
j
∑
tij>Pij(v−i)+ri(v−i)
fij(tij) ·
∑
k 6=j
rik(v−i)
≤
∑
i
∑
v−i
f−i(v−i) ·
∑
j
ri(v−i) ·
∑
tij>Pij(v−i)+ri(v−i)
fij(tij)
≤
∑
i
∑
v−i
f−i(v−i)
∑
j
rij(v−i) (Definition of rij(v−i))
=r
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Lemma 43. BVCG ≥ CORE2 − r. In other words, 2r + 2BVCG ≥ CORE.
Proof. Fix any v−i ∈ T−i, let tij ∼ Dij , define two new random variables
bij(v−i) = (tij − Pij(v−i))1[tij ≥ Pij(v−i)]
and
cij(v−i) = bij(v−i)1[bij(v−i) ≤ ri(vi)].
Clearly, cij(v−i) is supported on [0, ri(v−i)]. Also, we have
Etij∼Dij [cij(v−i)] =
∑
tij∈[Pij(v−i),Pij(v−i)+ri(v−i)]
fij(tij) · (tij − Pij(v−i)).
So we can rewrite CORE as ∑
i
∑
v−i∈T−i
f−i(v−i)
∑
j
E[cij(v−i)].
Now we will describe a VCG mechanism with per bidder entry fee. Define an entry fee function for
bidder i depending on v−i as ei(v−i) =
∑
j E[cij(v−i)] − 2ri(v−i). We will show that for any i and
other bidders types v−i ∈ T−i, bidder i accepts the entry fee ei(v−i) with probability at least 1/2. Since
bidders are additive, the VCG mechanism is exactly m separate Vickrey auctions, one for each item. So
Pij(v−i) = max 6`=i{v`j}, and for any set of S, its Clarke Pivot price for i to receive set S is
∑
j∈S Pij(v−i).
That also means
∑
j bij(v−i) is the random variable that represents bidder i’s utility in the VCG mech-
anism when other bidders bids are v−i. If we can prove Pr[
∑
j bij(v−i) ≥ ei(v−i)] ≥ 1/2 for all v−i, then
we know bidder i accepts the entry fee with probability at least 1/2.
It is not hard to see for any nonnegative number a,
a · Pr[bij(v−i) ≥ a] ≤ (a+ Pij(v−i)) · Pr[tij ≥ a+ Pij(v−i)] ≤ rij(v−i).
Therefore, because each cij(v−i) ∈ [0, ri(v−i)], by Lemma 37 we can again bound the second moment as:
E[cij(v−i)2] ≤ 2ri(v−i)rij(v−i). Since cij’s are independent,
Var[
∑
j
cij(v−i)] =
∑
j
Var[cij(v−i)] ≤
∑
j
E[cij(v−i)2] ≤ 2ri(v−i)2.
By Chebyshev inequality, we know
Pr[
∑
j
cij(v−i) ≤
∑
j
E[cij(v−i)]− 2ri(v−i)] ≤
Var[
∑
j cij(v−i)]
4ri(v−i)2
≤ 1/2.
Therefore, as bij(v−i) ≥ cij(v−i), we can conclude:
Pr[
∑
j
bij(v−i) ≥ ei(v−i)] ≥ 1/2
So the entry fee is accepted with probability at least 1/2 for all i and v−i. So:
BVCG ≥ 1
2
∑
i
∑
v−i∈T−i
f−i(v−i)
(
E[cij(v−i)]− 2ri(v−i)
)
=
CORE
2
− r.
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Analyzing SINGLE, OVER and UNDER: First we consider SINGLE, which is similar to Lemma 32.
Lemma 44. For any feasible pi(·), SINGLE ≤ OPTCOPIES.
Proof. Assume M is the ex-post allocation rule that induces pi(·). Consider another ex-post allocation rule
M ′ for the copies setting, such that for every type profile t, if M allocates item j to bidder i in the original
setting then M ′ serves agent (i, j) with probability Prv−i∼D−i [ti ∈ R(v−i)j ]. As M is feasible in the original
setting, M ′ is clearly feasible in the Copies setting. When agent (i, j) has type tij , her probability of being
served in M ′ is ∑
ti,−j
fi,−j(ti,−j) · piij(tij , ti,−j) · Pr
v−i∼D−i
[(tij , ti,−j) ∈ R(v−i)j ]
for all j and tij . Therefore, SINGLE is the ironed virtual welfare achieved by M ′ with respect to ϕ˜(·). Since
the copies setting is a single dimensional setting, the optimal revenue OPTCOPIES equals the maximum ironed
virtual welfare, thus no smaller than SINGLE.
Next, we move onto OVER. Recall that the terms in OVER are VCG prices times an indicator that the
bidder’s value exceeds the VCG prices. So we should hope to be able to cover OVER with some VCG-like
mechanism. We begin with the following technical propositions:
Proposition 45. Let pi(·) be any reduced form of a BIC mechanism in the original setting. Define
Πij(tij) = Eti,−j∼Di,−j [piij(ti)].
Then Πij(tij) is monotone in tij .
Proof. In fact, for all ti,−j , we must have piij(·, ti,−j) monotone increasing in tij . Assume for contradiction
that this were not the case, and let tij < t′ij with piij(tij , ti,−j) > piij(t
′
ij , ti,−j). Then (tij , ti,−j), (t
′
ij , ti,−j)
form a 2-cycle that violates cyclic monotonicity. This is because both types value all items except for j
exactly the same.
To expand a bit for readers not familiar with cyclic monotonicity: observe that tij < t′ij but piij(tij , ti,−j) >
piij(t
′
ij , ti,−j) implies that
(tij , ti,−j) · pii(tij , ti,−j) + (t′ij , ti,−j) · pii(t′ij , ti,−j) < (t′ij , ti,−j) · pii(tij , ti,−j) + (tij , ti,−j) · pii(t′ij , ti,−j)
⇒ (tij , ti,−j) ·pii(tij , ti,−j)−(tij , ti,−j) ·pii(t′ij , ti,−j) < (t′ij , ti,−j) ·pii(tij , ti,−j)−(t′ij , ti,−j) ·pii(t′ij , ti,−j).
This directly implies that no matter what prices are set for pi(tij , ti,−j) and pi(t′ij , ti,−j), if bidder i with
type (tij , ti,−j) is happy to tell the truth, then type (t′ij , ti,−j) strictly prefers to lie and report (tij , ti,−j) than
tell the truth.
Proposition 46. For any v ∈ T , any pi(·) that is a reduced form of some BIC mechanism,
OPTCOPIES ≥
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti) · Pij(v−i) · 1[tij ≥ Pij(v−i)].
Proof. Recall from Proposition 45 that every BIC interim form pi(·) in the original setting corresponds to
a monotone interim form in the copies setting, Π(·). Let M be any (possibly randomized) allocation rule
that induces Π(·), and p(·) a corresponding price rule (wlog we can let (M,p) be ex-post IR). Consider the
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following mechanism instead: on input t, first run (M,p) to (possibly randomly) determine a set of potential
winners. Then, if (i, j) is a potential winner, offer (i, j) service at price max{pij(t), Pij(v−i)). Whenever
(i, j) is a potential winner, tij ≥ pij(t). It is clear that in the event that (i, j) is a potential winner, and tij ≥
Pij(t−i), (i, j) will accept the price and pay at least Pij(v−i). Therefore, for any t as long as (i, j) is served
in M , then the payment from (i, j) in the new proposed mechanism is at least Pij(v−i)1[tij ≥ Pij(v−i)].
That means the total revenue of the new mechanism is at least
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j fi(ti)·piij(ti)·Pij(v−i)·1[tij ≥
Pij(v−i)], which is upper bounded by OPTCOPIES.
Lemma 47. OVER ≤ OPTCOPIES.
Proof. This can be proved by rewriting OVER and then applying Proposition 46.
OVER =
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti) ·
∑
v∈T
Pij(v−i)f(v)1[tij ≥ Pij(v−i)]
=
∑
v∈T
f(v)
∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti) · Pij(v−i) · 1[tij ≥ Pij(v−i)]
≤
∑
v∈T
f(v) · OPTCOPIES = OPTCOPIES
Finally, we move on to UNDER. When there is only one bidder, UNDER is always 0. Here, UNDER ≤
OPTCOPIES, and turns out to be the trickiest part to bound. Recall that UNDER contains terms that are (non-
favorite) values times indicators that these values do not exceed the VCG prices. So the high-level hope is
that the reason the VCG price for bidder i to receive item j exceeds tij is because someone else is paying
at least tij for something, and we might hope to be able to come up with a clever charging argument. At a
high level, this is indeed the plan, but the proof approach doesn’t clearly map onto this intuition. We apply
Proposition 48 (below) once for each type profile t, using the allocation of this mechanism on type profile
t to specify (ij , j) and let xj = tijj . Then taking the convex combination of the RHS of Proposition 48 for
all profiles t with multipliers f(t) gives UNDER≤ OPTCOPIES.
Proposition 48. Let {(ij , j)}j∈S⊆[m] be a feasible allocation in the copies setting. For all choices x1, . . . , xm ≥
0, OPTCOPIES≥∑v∈T f(v) ·∑j∈S xj · 1[Pijj(v−ij ) > xj ].
Proof. Before beginning the proof of Proposition 48, we will need the following definition and theorem due
to Gul and Stacchetti [GS99].
Definition 49. Let WT (S) be the maximum attainable welfare using only bidders in T and items in S.
Theorem 50. ([GS99]) If all bidders in T have gross substitute valuations, then WT (·) is a submodular
function.
Now with Theorem 50, consider in the Copies setting the VCG mechanism with lazy reserve xj for each
copy (i, j). Specifically, we will first solicit bids, then find the max-welfare allocation and call all (i, j) who
get allocated temporary winners. Then, if (i, j) is a temporary winner, (i, j) is given the option to receive
service for the maximum of their Clarke pivot price in the Copies setting and xj . It is clear that in this
mechanism, whenever any agent (i, j) receives service, the price she pays is at least xj . Also, it is not hard
to see that this is a truthful mechanism (for the Copies): for all other fixed bids, copy (i, j) can report a
bid exceeding the maximum of xj and their Clarke pivot price, or not. If they report a higher bid, they will
receive service and pay the maximum of their Clarke pivot price and xj . If they report a smaller number,
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they remain unserved. It’s clear that bidding the Copy’s true value is always optimal. Next, we argue for any
v ∈ T and j ∈ S, whenever Pijj(v−ij ) > xj , there exists some i such that (i, j) is served in the mechanism
above.
By the definition of Clarke pivot price, we know
Pijj(v−ij ) = W[n]−{ij}([m])−W[n]−{ij}([m]− {j}).
First, we show that if item j is allocated to some bidder i in the max-welfare allocation in the original setting
then vij ≥ Pij(v−i). Assume S′ to be the set of items allocated to bidder i. Since the VCG mechanism is
truthful, the utility for winning set S′ is better than winning set S′ − {j}:∑
k∈S′
vik − (W[n]−{i}([m])−W[n]−{i}([m]− S′))
≥
∑
k∈S′−{j}
vik − (W[n]−{i}([m])−W[n]−{i}([m]− S′ + {j})).
Rearranging the terms, we get
vij ≥W[n]−{i}([m]− S′ + {j})−W[n]−{i}([m]− S′)
≥W[n]−{i}([m])−W[n]−{i}([m]− {j})) (Theorem 50)
=Pij(v−i).
Now we still need to argue that whenever Pijj(v−ij ) > xj , item j is always allocated in the max-welfare
allocation to some bidder i with vij ≥ xj .
1. If agent (ij , j) is a temporary winner,
vijj ≥ Pijj(v−ij ) > xj .
Therefore, agent (ij , j) will accept the price.
2. If agent (ij , j) is not a temporary winner, let S′ be the set of items that are allocated to bidder ij in the
welfare maximizing allocation in the original setting. SinceW[n]−{ij}([m]−S′)−W[n]−{ij}([m]−S′−
{j}) ≥ W[n]−{ij}([m]) −W[n]−{ij}([m] − {j}) = Pijj(v−ij ) (by Theorem 50), and Pijj(v−ij ) >
xj , the following are true: (i) item j is awarded to some bidder i 6= ij in the welfare maximizing
allocation, because otherwise W[n]−{ij}([m]− S′) will have the same value as W[n]−{ij}([m]− S′ −
{j}); (ii) vij > xj because
vij ≥W[n]−{ij}([m]− S′)−W[n]−{ij}([m]− S′ − {j}) = Pijj(v−ij ) > xj .
So now we can conclude that for any j ∈ S there is certainly some i such that (i, j) is served whenever
Pijj > xj , and therefore the revenue of this mechanism in the Copies setting is at least
∑
v∈T f(v)·
∑
j∈S xj ·
1[Pijj(v−ij ) > xj ], which is exactly the same as the sum in the proposition statement.
Lemma 51. UNDER ≤ OPTCOPIES.
Proof. The idea is to interpret UNDER as the revenue of the following mechanism: let M be the mechanism
that induces pi(·). Sample t fromD, let S be the set of agents that will be served inM for type profile t in the
copies setting. Use tij to be the reserve price for j if (i, j) ∈ S, and use the mechanism in Proposition 48.
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First, the inner sum ∑
v−i∈T−i
tij · f−i(v−i) · 1[tij < Pij(v−i)]
only depends on ti, so the maximum of UNDER is achieved by a pi(·) induced by some deterministic mech-
anism. Wlog, we consider pi(·) is induced by a deterministic mechanism whose ex-post allocation rule is
x(·). Let us rewrite UNDER using x(·):∑
i
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
j
fi(ti) · piij(ti) ·
∑
v−i∈T−i
tij · f−i(v−i) · 1[tij < Pij(v−i)]
=
∑
t∈T
f(t)
∑
i
∑
j
xij(t) · tij ·
∑
v∈T
f(v) · 1[tij < Pij(v−i)]
=
∑
t∈T
f(t) ·
∑
v∈T
f(v)
∑
i
∑
j
xij(t) · tij · 1[tij < Pij(v−i)]
≤
∑
t∈T
f(t) · OPTCOPIES = OPTCOPIES
The penultimate inequality is because if we let {(ij , j)}j∈S be the set of agents such that by xijj(t) = 1,
then ∑
v∈T
f(v)
∑
i
∑
j
xij(t) · tij · 1[tij < Pij(v−i)] =
∑
v∈T
f(v) ·
∑
j∈S
xj · 1[Pijj(v−ij ) > xj ],
and by Proposition 48, this is upper bounded by OPTCOPIES.
Combining the above lemmas now yields our theorems:
Proof of Theorem 39: Combine Lemmas 41, 44, 47 and 51. 2
Proof of Theorem 40: Combining Lemmas 42, 43, 44, 47 and 51, we get the optimal revenue is upper
bounded by
3OPTCOPIES + 3r + 2BVCG.
Since OPTCOPIESis exactly the revenue of selling each item separately optimally using Myerson’s auction,
and r is the revenue of some mechanism (Ronen’s) that sells the items separately, we have OPTCOPIES≥ r,
proving the statement. 2
8 Duality Theory Beyond Additive Bidders
In this section we provide a statement of our duality theory that holds much more generally than when
bidders are unit-demand or additive. The technical ideas are exactly the same as in Section 3 and just
require updated notation.
Buyer Valuations. In this section, we will consider buyers with arbitrary valuation functions for subsets of
items. That is, buyer i has some valuation function ti(·) that takes as input a set of items and outputs a value.
Buyer i’s type is drawn from some distribution Di, and D = ×iDi is the joint distribution over profiles of
buyer types. We define F to be a set system over [n]× [m] that describes all feasible allocations.
Implicit Forms. The implicit form of an auction stores for all bidders i, and pairs of types ti, t′i, what is
the expected value that that agent i will receive when her real valuation function is ti, but she reports t′i to
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the mechanism instead (over the randomness in the mechanism and randomness in other agents’ reported
types, assuming they come from D−i) as pii(ti, t′i). We say that an implicit form is feasible if there exists
some feasible mechanism (that selects an outcome in F with probability 1) that matches the expectations
promised by the implicit form. If P (F , D) is defined to be the set of all feasible implicit forms, it is easy
to see (and shown in [CDW13b], for instance) that P (F , D) is closed and convex. Note that implicit forms
are computed over the same randomness as reduced forms, but store directly the value that bidder i receives
for having type ti and reporting t′i, instead of indirectly via interim probabilities.
We begin by writing the LP for revenue maximization in this more general setting (Figure 5). To proceed,
we’ll again introduce a variable λi(t, t′) for each of the BIC constraints, and take the partial Lagrangian of
LP 5 by Lagrangifying all BIC constraints. The theory of Lagrangian multipliers tells us that the solution to
LP 5 is equivalent to the primal variables solving the partially Lagrangified dual (Figure 6).
Definition 52. Let L(λ, pi, p) be a the partial Lagrangian defined as follows:
L(λ, pi, p) =
n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti) · pi(ti) +
∑
ti∈Ti
∑
t′i∈T+i
λi(ti, t
′
i) ·
(
pii(ti, ti)− pii(ti, t′i)−
(
pi(ti)− pi(t′i)
))
(7)
=
n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
pi(ti)
(
fi(ti)+
∑
t′i∈Ti
λi(t
′
i, ti)−
∑
t′i∈T+i
λi(ti, t
′
i)
)
+
n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
( ∑
t′i∈T+i
λi(ti, t
′
i) · ti(Xi(ti))−
∑
t′i∈Ti
t′i · λi(t′i, ti) · t′i(Xi(ti))
)
(8)
In Equation (8), we use Xi(ti) to denote the the random set awarded to bidder i when reporting type ti
to the mechanism. That is, ti(Xi(t′i)) := pii(ti, t
′
i).
Variables:
• pi(ti), for all bidders i and types ti ∈ Ti, denoting the expected price paid by bidder i when
reporting type ti over the randomness of the mechanism and the other bidders’ types.
• pii(ti, t′i), for all bidders i, and types ti, t′i ∈ Ti, denoting the expected value that bidder i receives
when her real type is type ti but reports t′i, over the randomness of the mechanism and the other
bidders’ types.
Constraints:
• pii(ti, ti) − pi(ti) ≥ pii(ti, t′i) − pi(t′i), for all bidders i, and types ti ∈ Ti, t′i ∈ T+i , guaranteeing
that the implicit form mechanism (pi, p) is BIC and BIR.
• pi ∈ P (F , D), guaranteeing pi is feasible.
Objective:
• Maximize:∑ni=1∑ti∈Ti fi(ti) · pi(ti), the expected revenue.
Figure 5: A Linear Program (LP) for Revenue Optimization.
Lemma 4 immediately holds in this setting as well, and the proof is identical. That is, a feasible dual
solution is still useful if and only if it induces a flow in the same graph. We will define virtual valuation
functions in essentially the same way, just updating notation.
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Variables:
• λi(ti, t′i) for all i, ti ∈ Ti, t′i ∈ T+i , the Lagrangian multipliers for Bayesian IC constraints.
Constraints:
• λi(ti, t′i) ≥ 0 for all i, ti ∈ Ti, t′i ∈ T+i , guaranteeing that the Lagrangian multipliers are non-
negative.
Objective:
• Minimize: maxpi∈P (F ,D),p L(λ, pi, p).
Figure 6: Partial Lagrangian of the Revenue Maximization LP.
Definition 53 (Virtual Value Function). For each λ, we define a corresponding virtual value function Φ(·),
such that for every bidder i, every type ti ∈ Ti, Φi(ti)(·) = ti(·) − 1fi(ti)
∑
t′i∈Ti λi(t
′
i, ti)(t
′
i(·) − ti(·)).
That is, Φi(ti) is a function that takes as input sets of items and outputs a value. For any set of items S,
Φi(ti)(S) = ti(S)− 1fi(ti)
∑
t′i∈Ti λi(t
′
i, ti)(t
′
i(S)− ti(S)).
We can now state the proper generalization of Theorem 6 in this general setting. The proof is identical
to that of Theorem 6 and we omit it. In the theorem statement,Xi(ti) again denotes the random set allocated
to bidder i when reporting type ti, so that pii(ti, t′i) = ti(Xi(t
′
i)).
Theorem 54 (Virtual Welfare ≥ Revenue). Let λ be any useful dual solution and M = (pi, p) any BIC
mechanism. Then the revenue of M is ≤ the virtual welfare of pi w.r.t. the virtual value function Φ(·)
corresponding to λ. That is:
n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti) · pi(ti) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti) · Φi(ti)(Xi(ti)).
Equality holds if and only if for all i, t, t′ such that λi(t, t′) > 0, the BIC constraint for bidder i between t
and t′ binds in M (that is, bidder i with type t is indifferent between reporting t and t′). Furthermore, let λ∗
be the optimal dual variables and M∗ = (pi∗, p∗) be the revenue optimal BIC mechanism, then the expected
virtual welfare with respect to Φ∗ (induced by λ∗) under pi∗ equals the expected revenue of M∗, and
pi∗ ∈ argmaxpi∈P (F ,D)

n∑
i=1
∑
ti∈Ti
fi(ti) · Φ∗i (ti)(Xi(ti))
 .
9 Conclusion
We present a new duality framework for Bayesian mechanism design, and show how to recover and improve
the state-of-the-art mechanisms for additive or unit-demand bidders with independent item values. Addi-
tionally, our proofs for the single-item, unit-demand, and additive settings are “unified” in the sense that
we’ve separated out part of the proof that is (nearly) identical for all three settings (the duality-based upper
bound, Section 5), so that the additional work necessary for each result is minimized (Sections 6 and 7).27
27One way to think of this is that if one wishes to exclusively understand the main result from a single one of [Mye81, CMS15,
BILW14, Yao15], the quickest way to do so is probably still just to read the original papers. However, if one wishes to understand
all of these results, a substantial fraction of the proofs overlap via our approach.
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Additionally, our framework provides a principled starting point for future work (as evidenced by the
numerous recent follow-ups of Section 1.3.4). Many of these works themselves explore new areas and
present further open questions (such as competition complexity [EFF+17b, LP16], limited complemen-
tarity [EFF+17a], two-sided markets [BCWZ17], and “one-and-a-half” dimensional settings [FGKK16,
DW17, DHP17]).
Our approach also yields insight into any incentives problem that can be captured by an LP with “incen-
tive constraints” and “feasibility constraints.” Domains such as signaling (e.g. [Dug14]) and contract theory
(e.g. [Car15]) are amenable to such LP formulations. Bayesian Persuasion seems an especially enticing
domain, as the algorithmic CDW framework has already found application there [DX15].
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